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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is basically a contract action wherein Plain-
tiff ordered certain electrical heaters from Defendant Brown 
who in turn ordered said heaters from Defendant Mallory; the 
heaters were claimed to be defective. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried by the Court, sitting without 
a jury, commencing on January 19, 1976, and continuing through 
until January 29, 1976, for a total of seven days of actual 
trial. Pursuant to stipulation, the case was tried first as 
to the issue of liability and second as to the issue of damages. 
Upon completion of the evidence on liability, the 
Court made the definite ruling that Mallory did not 
get what it thought it was going to get with respect to the 
heaters, and that the preponderance of the evidence showed 
that Valad was required to furnish a certain type of heater 
which it did not furnish. (T. 620) At the beginning of the 
next day, however, the Court reversed itself and said that it 
had not intended to rule absolutely that Valad was liable de-
spite the specific statement so made (T. 620, lns. 23-29), but 
that the Court did want to have post-trial briefs on the matter. 
The Court also indicated at the beginning of the bifurcated 
portion of the trial on damages, that the burden of persuasion 
was on Valad, not Mallory, the Plaintiff: 
As between the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
Valad, I indicated in chambers that I felt 
that the burden of persuasion in view of 
my rulings, would be upon Valad to persuade 
me that they were not liable. (T. 631-2) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the Court took the 
matter under advisement and all counsel submitted post-trial 
iii 
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briefs, which are found in the record. Subsequently, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as well as a Judgment were filed 
by the Plaintiff; Defendant Valad filed objections to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Motion for a New 
Trial. On April 5, 1977, all counsel met with Judge Taylor 
in chambers and agreed to certain Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law as to form, and further agreed that the Judg-
ment would be amended to conform to the revised Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 641) 
In the second appeal on this matter, Supreme Court 
No. 15544, issues are presented which bear no relevance to 
Valad's appeal and concern only Mallory and Brown. 
NOTE: The relevant abbreviations used herein are 
as follows: Record--"R."; Transcript--"T."; line or lines--
"lns."; Exhibit--"Ex. or Exs."; Purchase Order--"P.O."; kilo-
watt--"KW"; paragraph--"~!"; and drawing--"DWG". 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant, Valad Electric Heating Corporation, 
seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower Court in favor of 
Mallory and/or Brown. Appellant Valad further seeks judgment 
on its Counterclaim against Brown in the sum of $4,837.50. 
In the alternative, Valad seeks that its Motion for a New Trial ' 
be granted, and that the Court order a new trial on all of the 
issues in this case. 
iv 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Parties 
Plaintiff, Mallory Engineering, Inc., (hereinafter 
"Mallory"), whose principal office is located in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, designs and manufactures environmental equip-
ment "very similar to the three projects that are under con-
sideration in this Court case", according to it's president, 
Lee Farber. (T. 4) Defendant Ted R. Brown and Associates, 
Inc., (hereinafter "Brown") , is a firm of engineering consul-
tants located in Salt Lake City, Utah, which ordered certain 
industrial heaters from Valad for the purpose of selling them 
to Mallory. Valad Electric Heating Corporation (hereinafter 
"Valad"), is a manufacturer and designer of electric heaters 
and industrial heating equipment. It's only office and plant 
are located in Tarrytown, New York. (T. 357-8) 
Principal Characters 
The persons primarily involved in the negotiations 
for the parties were: 
A. Lee Farber, president of Mallory: Mr. 
Farber is a qualified mechanical engineer. (T. 3-4) Mr. 
Farber did almost all of the negotiating with Brown's Carl 
Nyman for the purchase of the heaters. 
B. Carl Nyman, Brown's engineer: The only 
person who negotiated on behalf of Brown was Carl Nyman, a 
qualified electrical engineer. (T. 226) Mr. Nyman negoti-
ated with both Mallory's Farber and Valad's Cecchini. 
c. Peter Cecchini, Valad's General Manager: 
All of the negotiations with respect to the order of the 
heaters by Brown were carried on by Peter Cecchini, Valad's 
-1-
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General Manager. Mr. Cecchini does not hold any technical 
engineering degrees such as Farber or Nyman, but has a degree 
in "industrial engineering", which deals generally with plant 
layout and business management of industrial plants, etc. 
(T. 356, 499) 
Jurisdictional Contacts 
Peter Cecchini's uncontradicted testimony at trial 
indicated that Valad had no employees, representatives, branch 
offices, or other sales contacts in the State of Utah. 
(T. 360) Further facts with respect to the validity of per-
sonal jurisdiction over Valad are set forth in Point I below. 
Preliminary Negotiations 
Beginning in January, 1972, (T. 358, 362) Brown 
sought out manufacturers of heating equipment which it wanted 
to buy in order to sell them to Mallory. (T. 75, 358-60, 219-
22) The latter had purchased similar heaters from companies 
other than Valad. (T. 14, 33) After consulting Peter Cecchini 
of Valad (T. 385) and Valad's advertising leaflets in Noveml:er, 
1972, Brown eventually chose to negotiate with Valad (T. 97-
99; Exs. 42 and 45) with whom it had never before dealt com-
mercialiy. Thereafter, the extended preliminary negotiations 
leading to the eventual written contract to sell (Ex. 20) 
between Valad and Brown were conducted entirely by them. 
(T. 74, 240-42, 252-75, 326-32, 351-2, 358-9, 364-400) 
Mallory's Governmental Contracts 
Mallory's Lee Farber testified that he had certain 
contract commitments to build mobile environmental chambers 
designed to test ammunition, weaponry, etc. (T. 4) Mallory 
needed heaters for the purpose of raising the temperature in 
-2-
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these environmental chambers. (T. 4) During 1972, Farber 
and Nyman negotiated for the purchase of various heaters. 
The evidence is conflicting with respect to whether or not 
Nyman read the basic government documents or had knowledge of 
Mallory's specific heater needs. (T. 6, 7, 10, 13, 101, 195-
6, 430-2) However, it is not contested that Valad never re-
ceived copies of the government specifications. (T. 6-10, 13, 
430-2) Further facts with respect to the government specifi-
cations appear in Point V below. 
Relationship Between The Parties 
The Record clearly establishes that Brown was 
Mallory's vendor and Mallory was the vendee. (T. 97) Simil-
arly, Brown and Valad had the relationship of Vendor-Vendee. 
(T. 20, 23, 25-6, 28, 220-21, 235, 254-5, 281) There was 
no contractual relationship between Mallory and Valad. Mal-
lory seeks to hold Valad only on a third-party beneficiary theory 
and the theory of guarantees. (Conclusion of Law No. 5) Fur-
ther facts with respect to the relationship of the parties 
appear in Point II below. 
Valad's Three Classes of Heaters 
Cecchini's uncontradicted testimony showed that 
Valad manufactured three types of heaters. (T. 426-30) The 
three types are: 
Class A: Stock-Items, mass produced, repetitive; 
heaters of various Valad designs; all advertised in it's 
catalog. (T. 426-7, 436) 
Class B: Modified stock heaters with the same fun-
damental theory, design and structure as stock items but modi-
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fied in size or shape for a customer's particular needs. 
(T. 427-30. 436-7, 475-6, 492-6) 
Class C: Specially designed or custom-made heaters, 
expressly guaranteed to meet the customers' special requirements 
for performance. (T. 427-8, 431, 437, 481, 524-5) 
The heaters involved in this litigation fall into 
the Class B only. (T. 429-30) Additional facts regarding 
the significance of the classes of heaters appear in Point II 
below. 
Of fer And Acceptance 
The initial negotiations between Cecchini and Nyman, 
with respect to the purchase of the heaters by Brown, resulted 
in Brown's P.O. 6730 for the 15 and 21 KW heaters. (Exs. 10 
and 11) This purchase order from Brown included a copy of 
a purchase order from Mallory to Brown, Mallory's P.O. 4016. 
(Ex. 9) These were not detailed enough to constitute a spe-
cific offer capable of acceptance by a manufacturer and were 
not accepted by Valad. On the basis of negotiations and 
discussions after those purchase orders, Valad presented 
Brown with detailed structural shop drawings for the 15 and 21 
KW heaters. (Exs. 17 and 18) These constituted Valad's 
specific offer for the manufacture of the heaters. Nyman 
and Farber reviewed these drawings (the revised number 17 
and the new 18), made certain modifications and approved 
them. This approval was written on both drawings, cons ti tu ting 
Exhibit 20 (of which Exhibit 83 is the original), in Nyman's 
handwriting, by the words: "Approved for construction". 
Thus, Exhibits 20 and 83 became the only contract in the 
case between Valad and Brown. 
-4-
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Shipment Of The Heaters And Problems 
Sometime after the speed letter of January 26, 1973, 
arrived (Ex. 20), Valad began manufacturing the heaters and 
shipped the same in mid and late March, 1973. (T. 36, 713, 
Exs. 36 and 37) Valad manufactured the 12 KW heaters repre-
sented by Mallory P.O. 4047 (Ex. 12), and these are not at 
issue in this case. Valad never agreed to manufacture the 50 
and 36 KW heaters and the record is devoid of any evidence that 
such were accepted. 
Mallory installed the heaters after receipt in late 
March or early April and indicated its dissatisfactions to 
Brown's Nyman on or about April 30, 1973. (T. 241, 75, 415) 
At that point, Mallory got in touch with Valad for the first 
time (T. 74-5), and several conversations were held. The 
result of these conversations was Mallory's repudiation of 
any further contract with Valad, specifically for the 36 and 
50 KW heaters. (Ex. 35) Additional facts with respect to the 
time sequence of the significant and relevant events in this 
case appear below. 
-5-
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POINT I 
THE COURT DOES NOT HAVE PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT VALAD 
UNDER THE "LONG AR..'1" STATUTE, U.C.A. 
1953 §§78-27-22 THROUGH 25. NOR 
HAS DEFENDANT VALAD MADE A GENERAL 
APPEARANCE OR IN ANY OTHER WAY SUB-
JECTED ITSELF TO THE PERSONAL JURIS-
DICTION OF THE COURT. 
There can be no valid judgment against Valad since 
the Court in the first instance never had personal jurisdic-
tion over Valad. The Complaint herein was filed on September 
20, 1973, and purportedly served upon Valad pursuant to the 
provisions of the Long Arm Statute (U.C.A. 1953 §§78-27-22 
through 24) in New York. (R. 9, 11) On November 1, 1973, 
Valad responded pro se with a single, "blue backed" document 
(filed as one document in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office), 
and consisting of two parts: 
A. A document entitled "Answer, Counterclaim, 
and Cross-Complaint" (R. 23) which was actually a 
response to Defendant Brown's Cross-Complaint; and 
B. A document entitled "Answer" (R. 24-33), 
which raised all of the jurisdictional defenses. 
(R. 25-27) 
The Lower Court And First Appeal 
On April 14, 1975, Defendant Val ad filed a "special 
appearance" (R. 125-6) and an Affidavit (R. 137-141) , treated 
by the Court as a Motion to Quash Service of Summons (R. 142 
and 170), and denied on April 28, 1975. (R. 170) 
Valad's affidavit is very significant to this case. 
(R. 137-141) It specifically denied the presence of agents, 
sales, offices, bank accounts, advertising and any other sig-
nificant contact in Utah. It shows the disputed transaction 
to be isolated. The allegations contained in the affidavit 
therein have never been contested, challenged or disproven, 
-6-
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either on the previous appeal or at trial. 
The Remittitur 
Defendant Valad filed a Notice of Appeal on May 
12, 1975 (R. 173), followed by a Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal on May 23, 1975 (Supreme Court No. 14102). The Inter-
locutory Appeal was sought due to Brown's filing of a Motion 
to Dismiss. (Supreme Court No. 14102) 
Via the Remittitur on June 2, 1975, the Court grantai 
Brown's Motion to Dismiss the Appeal but specifically reserved 
the issue of personal jurisdiction for any ultimate appeal 
in the matter. (R. 178) That same Remittitur, by its own 
terms, rendered the interlocutory appeal of Valad moot. 
(R. 178) 
Testimony At Trial 
During the trial, the following testimony came in 
unchallenged and unrefuted: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
(Schmidt, Attorney for Valad) : Did you 
ever have a sales representative in the 
State of Utah? 
(Valad's Cecchini): No, never. 
Did you ever before do business in the 
State of Utah? 
No. 
How many transactions, if you can remember 
the number, did you have with Ted R, Brown 
where you actually received purchase orders 
from them? 
Before this? 
Before this case. 
None. 
So that the only purchase orders you ever 
received from Ted R. Brown were those involved 
in this present litigation? 
Yes. That is correct. 
You have no branch office in the State of Utah? 
None. 
You never did? 
No. (T. 360) 
-7-
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Lack Of Minimum Contacts In Utah 
The line of cases beginning with Hill v. Zale, 25 
Utah 2d 357, 482 P. 2d 332 (1971), clearly defines the limits 
of "long arm" jurisdiction in Utah. Hill says that the Utah 
statutes, U.C.A. 1953 §78-27-22 et seq., require the "trans-
action of business" or "doing business" within the state in 
order to subject a nonresident corporation to the jurisdiction 
of 0ur Courts. Id. at 333. The "doing business" test was 
met by the analysis of a number of factors such as the 
presence of local offices, personnel, continuous, systematic 
activity, etc., "none of which is alone the sine qua non to 
establish a business presence in the state." (See the list 
at 482 P. 2d at 334) None of the parties to this action 
have alleged in the complaints or elsewhere, that Valad had 
any of the contacts required by Hill v. Zale. 
5, ~ill; etc.) 
(R. 4, UO; 
There are no cases in Utah or elsewhere which 
predicate jurisdiction on finding of such "minimum contacts" 
as Valad's in Utah. The analysis of Hill v. Zale has been 
applied over and over again since 1971 to deny jurisdiction 
against a defendant in Valad's position. See Union Ski 
Company v. Union Plastics Corp., 548 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1976), 
wherein the Court stated that the burden was on the Plaintiff 
to affirmatively demonstrate that the Defendant comes within 
the requirements set forth in Hill. (548 P. 2d at 1259) 
See also Packaging Corporation of America v. Morris, 561 
P. 2d 680 (Utah 1977); and Hodge v. Sands Manufacturing Co., 
150 S.E. 2d 793 at 800 (W. Va. 1966), which is almost iden-
tical to the case at the bar. 
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A. 
VALAD DID NOT ENTER 
A GENERAL APPEARANCE 
Mallory and Brown claim without merit that Valad 
has done acts which constitute a general appearance, thus 
subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the Court herein. Why? 
Valad allegedly filed an "Answer" and served answers to inter-
rogatories thereafter. The documents allegedly constituting 
the "general appearance" are the single, "blue-backed" docu-
rrents found in the record at pages 23 through 33, and the 
responses to discovery found in the record at pages 63 through 
107 and 115 through 122. 
Objection To Jurisdiction 
Raised At First Opportunity 
The documents found in the record pages 23 through 
33 are, significantly, Valad's first appearance of any kind 
in the record. The pleading found at page 23 is, by misnomer, 
entitled "Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Complaint". However, 
a cursory reading will reveal that it is only a one-page 
response to the Cross-Complaint of Defendant Brown. 
The pleading that begins at page 24 in the record 
is titled an "Answer". It raises as the "First Defense" the 
lack ot jurisdiction over the person of Valad. (R. 25-27, 11116-18) 
This defense explains at length that Valad never previously 
transacted any business within the State of Utah with either 
Mallory or Brown (R. 26, 11118, 9, 10) and that Valad has no 
domicile, nor any office, files, facilities, equipment, sales 
representatives, employees, etc., in Utah. (R. 26 1112) It 
cannot be contested that Valad is clearly claiming, at its 
earliest opportunity, that the Court lacked personal juris-
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diction over it tor anv purpose whatsoever, as to both Brown 
and Mallory. Technically, the words of objection to juris-
diction are not found in the document mistitled "Answer, 
Counterclaim and Cross-Complaint" (R. 2 3) filed simul taneouslz 
with the "Answer". (R. 24) 
No Waiver Of The Jurisdictional Defense 
Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a party waives all defenses and objections which 
it does not present in its answer. Valad raised the objection 
to jurisdiction in its answer. (R. 26) Rule 12(b) further 
provides that: 
No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in 
a responsive pleading ... or by further pleading 
after the denial of such motion or objection. 
Valad's objection to jurisdiction contained in the 
"Answer" was physically joined (R. 23, 24) to the mis-titled 
"Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-Complaint" (R. 2 3J, and thus 
was part of the same responsive pleading. It was obviously 
intended to be joined with the defenses to Brown's Counter-
claim. Since Valad raised the issue of no personal juris-
diction in its responsive pleading designated "Answer", it 
cannot be waived just because it was joined with other de-
fenses or pleadings 
No General Appearance 
The distinction between general and special appear-
ances has been narrowing. In holding that a motion to release 
the attachment did not constitute a general appearance, the 
Court recently noted the following: 
The distinction between general and special 
appearances has been abolished by the language 
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contained in Rule 12(b) as follows: 
No defense or objection is waived by 
being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further 
pleading after the denial of such motion 
or objection. 
Brown v. Carnes Corp, 547 P. 2d 206 at 207 (Utah 1976). 
[See also Green v. Roth, 192 So. 2d 537 (Fla. App. 1966); ~ 
v. Sharp, 409 P. 2d 1019 (Kan. 1966); and Anderson v. Mikel 
Drilling Co., 102 N.W. 2d 293 (Minn. 1960)]. 
Substance And Intent Prevail 
Over Technicalities 
The reason for the fading distinction between gen-
eral and special appearances is the general policy of the 
Federal Rules favoring substance over technicalities of form. 
This policy has been expressed as follows: 
We recognize that the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure must be construed liberally to bring 
about a just, speedy and inexpensive determination 
of every action. Any requirement of compliance 
with barren technical formalities is to be avoided. 
(Emphasis added) Plant Economy, Inc. v. Mirror 
Insulation Co., Inc., 308 F. 2d 375 at 378 (3rd 
Cir. 1962) 
Thus, where the contention is made, as in the case 
at the bar, that a party has committed technical acts which 
should subject him to the personal jurisdiction of the Court 
despite a contrary intent, the substance of the acts should 
prevail over the form. See Farmer's Trust v. Alexander, 6 A. 
2d 262 at 264 (Pa. 1939). The intent of a party is paramount: 
"An appearance is not to be inferred except as a result of 
acts from which an intent to do so may properly be inferred." 
6 C.J.S., Appearances, Sec. 12, P. 19. 
Utah cases dealing with the issue of "appearance" 
show that this Court has been reluctant to construe a general 
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appearance on a technicality. In Fiberboard Paoer Products 
Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 475 P. 2d. 1005 (1970), 
the Defendant's oro se letter to Plaintiff's attorney, with 
a copy to the Court Clerk, denying that he owed the bill, was 
not a general appearance. Id. at 1006. In Housely v. Ana-
conda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P. 2d 390 (1967), the non-
resident defendant's counsel purportedly appeared "specially" 
at a hearing to amend Plaintiff's complaint ~nd actually 
objected thereto. The Supreme Court rejected Plaintiff's 
claim that this constituted a general appearance because the 
intent to make a special appearance by the defendant was 
clearly stated. Cf. - Barber v. calder, 522 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1974). 
Other jurisdictions facing the issue of whether 
a party has unintentionally done acts which amount to a 
general appearance, despite contrary intent, have arrived at 
similar results to that of Utah. See Cornett v. Smith, 466 
S.W. 2d 641 at 642 (Ky. 1969). 
The facts of the case at the bar show that Valad 
never intended to appear, nor in fact appeared generally, 
or waive it's objection to personal jurisdiction. At the 
instance of its first appearance in Court on October 29, 
1973, Valad raised the objection to personal jurisdiction. 
(R. 24-25) The objection to jurisdiction was stated in clear, 
concise, and unmistakable terms. The claim that the filing 
of the answer to Brown's cross-complaint (R. 23) subjected 
Valad to jurisdiction is clearly putting form and technicality 
above substance, and it is not countenanced by either the 
letter or the spirit of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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B. 
FURTHER PLEADING OR RESPONSE 
TO DISCOVERY AFTER THE OBJECTIOH 
TO JURISDICTION BY VALAD DID NOT 
SUBJECT IT TO THE JURISDICTION 
OF THE COURT. 
Valad responded to a request for admissions and 
answered interrogatories in February, 1974. (R. 63-74; 
75-107; 115-122) This could not subject Valad to the personal 
jurisdiction of the Court. All of these discovery responses 
were filed pursuant to the mandatory rules requiring re-
sponses to lawful discovery requests. See Rules 33 and 36, 
U.R.C.P. The next Court document filed by Defendant Valad 
after said discovery responses was the "Special Appearance 
and Notice", treated by the Court as a Motion to Quash. 
(R. 135) Because the filing of discovery responses is 
mandatory, it cannot constitute a general appearance. Rule 
12(b); Semole v. Sansoucie, 104 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972); see 
also Stelly v. Quick Mfg., 229 So. 2d 584 (La. 1969). 
c. 
A CORPORATION MAY NOT APPEAR 
PRO SE, AND ANY PURPORTED 
PRO SE APPEARANCE CANNOT AMOUNT 
TO A GENERAL APPEARANCE. 
The law is well established in this state and 
elsewhere that a corporation cannot appear oro se. Tuttle 
v. Hi-land Dairymen's Assoc., 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P. 2d 
616 (1960); 19 ALR 3d 1013. This was conceded by counsel 
for Mallory and Brown when they filed a joint motion in 
March of 1975, eighteen months after the case had begun, to 
compel Valad to appear by counsel or suffer default. (R. 123, 
128) All of the pleadings and Court documents in the file 
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prior to this time were filed pro se by the corporation's 
general manager, Peter Cecchini. (R. 23-24, 33, the "blue-
back" ;:over sheet between 33 and 34, 73, 74, 88 and 107) 
Therefore, Defendant Valad was not properly before the Court 
in any event and any pleadings or documents that may have been 
filed with the Court cannot amount to a general appearance 
or subject Valad to the jurisdiction of the Court. 
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POINT II 
UNDER COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES OF 
CONTRACT LAW AND UNDER THE RULES 
OF CONTRACT FORMATION PROMULGATED 
BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
THERE WERE NO MANIFESTATION OF 
MUTUAL ASSENT AND NO WRITTEN CON-
TRACT TO SELL BETWEEN VALAD AND BROWN 
UNTIL, AFTER PROTRACTED PRELIMINARY 
NEGOTIATIONS, VALAD ACCEPTED BROWN'S 
COUNTER-OFFER (EXHIBIT 20). THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS REFER TO NO 
FACTS CONCERNING CONTRACT FORMATION. 
THEY RELY ONLY ON UNACCEPTED PURCHASE 
ORDERS WHICH VALAD NEVER SIGNED IN ANY 
DOCUMENT REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS; AND THEY DISREGARD EXHIBIT 
20 (ALSO EXHIBIT 83). 
A. 
1. On December 14, 1972, Mallory sent its Purchase 
Order No. 4016 (Ex. 9) to Brown to purchase the 15 and 21 KW 
heaters, which were not yet in existence and were "future 
goods" under the UCC. Under the applicable Statute of Frauds 
and the UCC, a written "contract to sell" is required. 
2. On December 15th, Brown sent its P.O. 6730 to 
Valad for the same two non-existent heaters (Exs. 10 and 68): 
"Subject to specifications and limitations of Mallory Engineering 
P.O. 4016 attached". But it was not attached. Brown's purchase 
order concluded with the sentence: "Engineering drawings and 
certification of NBFU (National Board of Fire Underwriters) 
compliance to be furnished by 12/22 so duct fabrication can 
proceed." This offer was not accepted by Valad and never became 
part of any written contract to sell. The certification was 
not sent "by 12/22". 
3. On December 20, 1972, Brown by letter sent an 
addendum to its P.O. 6730 to Valad (Ex. 11), on which the =eluding 
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sentence was: "We are also enclosing a copy of Mallory's pur-
chase order to us and a sketch that should have gone forward 
with our original order, for your file." Mallory's P.O. 4016 
(Ex. 9) was enclosed with this letter but not the sketch. 
(T. 392) This was not an offer; it was merely part of an 
offer. 
4. Exhibit 17, Valad's letter (and enclosure) dated 
January 19, 1973, was sent to Nyman (Brown) and, on Nyman's 
specific instructions (T. 407), to Lee Farber (Mallory). It 
reads: 
Enclosed are two (2) copies of DWG. #73-
119 on our vent duct heater for a total 
of 21 KW, 208 VAC on your P.O. 6730. 
Enclosed with this letter (Ex. 17) was Valad's shop 
drawing (without annotation or postil) No. 73-119, dated "1/73" 
(January 1973), which is also part of Exhibit 17. 
All of the prior telephone communications and corres-
pondence between Nyman (for Brown) and Cecchini (for Valad) had 
produced a sufficient convergence of minds as to enable Valad 
to develop a design and structural drawing of the still non-
existent heater inadequately attempted in Brown's P.O. 6730* 
(Ex. 10) dated December 15, 1973. The discussions between 
Cecchini and Nyman had clarified, refined and modified P.O. 
6730 to the point where Valad could draft and was now asking 
*No purchase order presented by Mallory or Brown was ever 
signed by Valad nor accepted in any document signed by it. Thus, 
Plaintiff's claim that Brown's or Mallory's purchase orders con-
stituted a contract complying with the Statute of Frauds is un-
tenable. Besides, these purchase orders were not specific andr·· 
detailed enough to enable anyone to manufacture the theoreuca.,. 
proposed, but non-existent, heaters. 
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5, 
approval of its drawing No. 73-119, which incorporated these 
clarifications, refinements and modifications. Neither this 
drawing, nor the letter transmitting them, say anything about 
performance-standards.* But 1hey did constitute Va lad's first 
firm of fer to Brown which the latter could accept or refuse 
to accept. As appears below, Brown did not accept this 
firm offer by Valad. 
5. Exhibit 11, dated December 20, 1972, shows that 
Brown changed, and to that extent abandoned, its P.O. 6730 
dated December 15, 1972 (Ex. 10), to which Valad's transmittal 
letter in Exhibit 17 had referred. That was tantamount to 
an anticipatory rejection of Valad's firm offer (Ex. 17) based 
on the supplemented P.O. 6730. 
During the period between the dispatch, on December 
15, 1972, of Brown's P.O. 6730 to Valad and December 23, 1972, 
when Valad received Exhibit 11 (dated December 20, 1972), there 
were many further phone calls and other communications between 
Nyman and Cecchini which further clarified, refined and modi-
fied Exhibit 10, Brown's P.O. 6730: 
(1) 12/15/72: A telephone call (T. 395) 
(2) 12/19/72: A Valad letter to Nyman 
(Ex. 70; T. 391) 
(3) 12/19/72: Telephone call (T. 395) 
(4) 12/20/72: Brown's P.O. 6730 was 
amended by its letter of that date 
to Valad which added to that purchase 
order (Ex. 11) 
(5) 12/20/72: Telephone call (T. 258, 
393-4, 397) 
(6) 12/21/72: Valad's letter to Brown 
( T. 3 9 5; Ex. 72) 
(7) 12/21/72: Valad's "Price Quotation" 
with sketch (Ex. 54) 
*As Exhibits 17 (and Exhibits 20 and 83) show. 
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( 8) 
( 9) 
(10) 
12/21/72: 
12/22/72: 
regarding 
Ex. 47) 
12/22/72: 
Phone call (T. 393-4) 
Valad's letter to Nyman 
thermostats, etc. (T. 396-7; 
Valad's letter (T. 119-20) 
All of the foregoing negotiations would have been 
unnecessary had Valad actually accepted Brown's P.O. 6730 
(Ex. 10) or had Brown considered its P.O. 6730 final and 
satisfactory. 
6. Exhibit 18, Valad's transmittal letter dated 
January 22, 1973, changed the picture by revising its shop 
drawing #73-119 and by submitting another shop drawing nurn-
bered 73-120. It read: 
Enclosed are two (2) copies of DWG. #73-120 
on our Vent Duct Heater, 5 KW ea. 208V, 1 PH 
on P.O. #6730. [A]lso enclosed are two (2) 
revised copies of DWG. #73-119, 7 KW eac. 
208V, P.O. #6730. Two hole location was left 
off. 
This was obviously a new firm offei: (or counter-
offer with respect to P.O. 6730) proposed by Valad for Brown's 
acceptance. Up to this point in time, the numerous discussions 
and negotiations had produced absolutely no contract to sell 
and no meeting of minds. It had produced only conversations 
searching for specifics on which to agree. The new firm offer 
(or counter-offer vis-a-vis Brown's P.O. 6730) by Valad replacec 
and revised Valad's transmittal letter dated January 19, 1973 
and its enclosed shop drawing, both of which constituted 
Exhibit 17. 
B. 
Exhibits 20 and 83*, dated January 26, 1973, are 
Nyman' s speedletter and enclosures (drawings 73-119 and 73-1201 
*Exhibit 8 3 is the original speedletter and its enclosures 
(drawings annotated by Nyman); Exhibit 20 is a copy of Exhibit 
83. Where, in this brief, one of these two is mentioned, the 
other is intended, also. 
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which are Brown's response to Valad's new firm offer, described 
in Section 6, supra. By Exhibit 18, Valad had sent to Brown 
two pairs of each of two different shop drawings without hand-
written annotations or postils. Now, by Exhibit 83 (also Ex. 20) 
Brown returned to Valad one of each of the two different pairs 
of shop drawings; i.e. Valad's revised shop drawing #73-119 and 
Valad's shop drawing #73-120. But the returned drawings were 
now annotated by comments on the face of each drawing in Nyman's 
handwriting and by his instructions in his speedletter. (Exs. 
20 and 83) These annotations show that Brown had substantially 
accepted Valad's new firm offer (its counter-offer vis-a-vis 
Brown's P.O. 6730). To be more precise, the annotations showed 
that Brown would accept Valad's said new firm offer provided 
certain changes, as detailed in Nyman's annotations and speed-
letter, were made. In other words, as each of the two returned 
drawings showed (by postils in Nyman's handwriting above Nyman's 
signature) the Valad new firm offer (Ex. 18) was "Approved for 
construction, subject to comments as made" on the drawings and 
in the speedletter. (Exs. 20 and 83; T. 411-12, 429-30, 451-53) 
valad promptly agreed to these changes by telephone; 
then valad proceeded immediately to manufacture the heaters 
as shown on the drawings, which Nyman had "approved for con-
struction". (Ex. 20) In so manufacturing the heaters, Valad 
followed exactly the comments and annotations made by Nyman in 
Exhibit 20, which is the only manifestation of mutual assent 
in this case; the only written contract in this case which sat-
sifies the Statute of Frauds. (Exs. 20 and 83) 
c. 
The following legal principles are applicable to this 
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written contract as set forth above: 
1. Communications which constitute mere negotia-
tions preparatory to an agreement do not imply a contract. 
Head v. Providence Ins. Co., 2 Crunch 127, 2 L.Ed. 129; South 
Boston Iron Co. v. United States, 118 U.S. 37. 
2. There can be no contract in compliance with 
constitutional due process where the minds of the parties have 
not met. Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29; Holder v. Anltman, 
M. & Co., 169 U.S. 81; Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 
362 P. 2d 427 (1961); Oberhansley v. Earle, 572 P. 2d 1384 
(Utah 1977). 
3. What one party to a contract understands or 
believes (see e.g. T. 101-4, 106-11, 113-16) does not govern 
construction thereof unless such understanding or belief is 
induced by conduct of the other party. National Bank of 
Metropolis v. Kennedy, 17 Wall 19; 21 L.Ed. 554. 
4. The Courts may not, constitutionally, make for 
the parties a better agreement than they themselves have been 
satisfied to make. Green County v. Qunlan, 211 U.S. 582; 
New Orleans v. New Orleans Waterworks Co., 142 U.S. 79; Imperiai 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U.S. 452. 
5. In contract law, the specific (e.g. structural 
drawings like Exhibit 83) prevail over the general or merely 
theoretical (like Brown's and Mallory's purchase orders not 
capable of manufacture). Smoot v. United States, 237 U.S. 38. 
6. Where as here, both parties treated a document 
(Exhibits 20 and 83) as the agreement and acted upon it, an agre> 
ment is legally implied. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refini~ 
Co., 267 U.S. 233. 
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D. 
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts makes "manifestation of assent by the parties who form 
the contract to the terms thereof" a "requirement of the law 
for the formation of an informal contract". (Ch. 3 § 19) In 
this connection the Restatement classifies contracts as "formal 
or informal" (Ch. 1, §6) and defines "informal contracts" as 
all contracts other than "contracts under seal," "recognizances" 
and "negotiable instruments." (Ch. 1 §§6, 7 and 11) 
On the subject of "Offer and Acceptance", the Re-
statement states: 
The manifestation of mutual assent almost 
invariably takes the form of an offer or 
proposal by one party accepted by the other 
party or parties. (Ch. 3, §22) 
Its "Comment" on § 22 is, in part: 
This rule is rather one of necessity than 
of law. In the nature of the case one 
party must ordinarily first announce what he 
will before there can be any manifestation 
of mutual assent ... 
Exhibit 20 as a counter-offer was so definite in 
its terms that Valad was able immediately to manufacture it. 
(Restatement, Ch. 3, § 32) This was not true of Mallory's 
P.O. 4016 (Ex. 9) nor of Brown's P.O. 6730 (Ex. 10) as aug-
mented by Brown's letter of December 20, 1972. (Ex. 11) 
Even if Valad had not notified Brown of its accep-
tance of the Brown counter-offer (Ex. 20), Valad did what 
that counter-offer requested; i.e., it produced heaters 
required by Exhibit 20, designed and constructed in every 
detail as that Exhibit required. Thus, Valad's performance, 
without more, operates as a promise to render complete per-
formance. (Restatement, Ch. 3 § 63) 
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E. 
Under the U.C.C., "goods which are not both existing 
and identified are 'future' goods"; and a "purported present 
sale of future goods or any interest therein operates as a 
contract to sell". 70A-2-105(1) and (2) The contract formed 
by Valad's acceptance of Brown's counter-offer (Ex. 20) was 
a "contract to sell" within the meaning of UCC 70A-2-105(2). 
The only contract in this case was the contract to 
sell made by Valad's acceptance of Brown's counter-offer 
(Ex. 20) . The goods contracted for were non-existent at the 
time. They were "future goods" which as such could be specifiec 
for accurate contractual identification only by a structural 
drawing like Exhibit 20. The heaters produced by Valad con-
formed with that contract because they were "in accordance with 
the obligations under the contract" (Exhibit 20) within the 
meaning of 70A-2-106(2}. That contract did not violate the 
Statute of Frauds, since it was in writing. (Ex. 20) 
If proffered as a contract, the purchase orders, 
being unsigned by Valad (and unaccepted by it in any other 
signed documents) would violate the Statute of Frauds. Neither 
the Trial Court nor the Plaintiff bothered to consider this. 
Under the UCC, a contract to sell may be made "in 
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by 
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.' 
Brown and Mallory did recognize the existence of the Exhibit 
20 (83) . And an "agreement sufficient to constitute a con-
i 
tract of sale may be found even though the moment of its makinc I 
is undetermined". 70A-2-201 (2) 
No language spelling out a performance warranty or 
-22-
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i 
'I 
'I 
performance standards was part of the counter-offer (Ex. 
20) accepted by Valad. The statutory warranty of title and 
against infringement was not violated by Valad. 70A-2-312(1) 
and (3), and 70A-2-313 
In the instant case there was no implied warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose under 70A-2-315, because 
neither Brown nor Valad knew or understood, when their contract 
was formed, the particular purpose for which the heaters were 
required, nor the environment in which they would be placed. 
(T. 6-7, 430-432, 424-427, 481, 493) Valad never saw the 
government contracts. Therefore, the buyer Brown could not 
rely on Valad's skill or judgment to select suitable heaters 
within the meaning of 70A-2-315. Brown was buying from Valad 
for the purpose of reselling to Mallory; and the written con-
tract to sell (Ex. 20) was basically a specific, structural 
drawing which required Valad to build the heaters pursuant 
to the design delineated in those drawings. 
Brown, before entering into the contract to sell, 
could not examine the goods (which were not yet made) nor 
a sample thereof (there was none) nor a model thereof (it 
existed only virtually in the drawings which the buyer ap-
proved). Therefore, a warranty of performance must be ex-
eluded, since a drawing can't be tested for performance and 
no prototype was made by Valad or ordered from or tested by 
Valad or anyone else. See 70A-2-316. The heaters covered 
by the written agreement (Ex. 20) were in Class B, not Class 
C, of the manufacturer's products. (T. 425-430, 437, 452, 
475, 481-2, 492-3, 495-6, 524-530) 
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F. 
Nowhere in the Findings of Fact is there any state-
ment which indicates when or whether a legal contract between 
Valad and Brown eventuated or what the terms of that contract 
were. Finding Nos. 4 through 9 were written on the assumption 
that Brown's P.O. 6730 (dated December 15, 1972) as amended 
by Brown's letter dated December 20, 1972 (Ex. 11) constituted 
a contract without the least respect for the Statute of Frauds. 
That assumption is factually and legally erroneous. No evi-
dence suggests that Valad ever accepted Brown's P.O. 6730 or 
its addendum dated December 20, 1972. Each was incomplete 
without the other, even from Brown's point of view (as Exhibit 
11 shows). Both were superseded eventually by Exhibit 20. 
The assumption that Valad accepted Exhibits 10 and 11 does 
not explain the negotiations about the structure of the 15 
and 21 KW heaters which continued, unabated, from December 
15, 1972 to January 26, 1973, when Brown sent its speedletter 
enclosing Valad's annotated drawings (Ex. 20). Nor does that 
assumption explain Exhibit 20, reference to which the Trial 
Judge carefully but inexplicably eliminated from his Findings 
of Fact. 
These Findings generally omit any indication of 
contract formation or the precise terms and conditions of the 
contract on which the Trial Court relied to find a breach by 
Valad. The most important document in case, Exhibit 20, was 
completely neglected by the Trial Court. Apart from that 
document and its acceptance by Valad, there is absolutely no 
evidence in the record of mutual assent, contract or meeting 
of minds. The Findings never show what offer Valad accepted 
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from Brown prior to January 26, 1973, to form a plausible and 
legal contract to sell. If Exhibit 20 (83) is not the con-
tract to sell, there was none. Thus, the Findings unveil no 
contract on which the Trial Court could lawfully rely. 
The Findings indicate an attempt to convert unac-
cepted offers (e.g. Exhibits 9 and 10) which were naked pur-
chase orders for non-existent goods (i.e., "future goods" 
under the UCC) into a contract binding Valad. 
Finding No. 2 goes beyond the Trial Court's ruling 
when it accepted the Government contracts in evidence. They 
were admitted only "to show ... there was a contract for 
the production of environmental units". (T. 6-10) Finding No. 
2 erroneously includes Mallory's "commitments to manufacture 
.• environmental units which required as part of their es-
sential components some electrical heaters of precise and 
exacting specifications." (Emphasis added) The contents of 
the Government contracts were not part of the admitted evi-
dence. Finding No. 2 erroneously makes them a part. 
Finding No. 10 fails to give the valid reasons, 
appearing in the record, why the 36 and 50 KW heaters were 
not shipped. (T. 429-430) 
Finding No. 15 disregards the overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating that (a) Brown and Mallory accepted delivery of 
the 15 and 21 KW heaters*; (b) the delivery dates were not 
hard and fast conditions*; (c) the delivery dates were waived 
or modified*; and (d) the delivery dates were not of the 
essence in the contract to sell (Exhibit 20)*. 
*These matters are discussed in Points III and IV of 
this brief. 
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Finding Nos. 16 and 17 are irrelevant insofar as 
they refer to the 12 KW heater, about which there was no dis-
pute. Valad admitted having made the 12 KW heaters incorrect11 
because of a typographical error which read 1.2 KW instead of 
12 KW. (T. 455-459) Indeed, Valad had, by its Interrogatory 
No. 2, asked Mallory, for the purpose of delimiting the items 
of damage, to detail all of the violations of contract it 
was claiming. (R. 294, T. 67) That had the effect of con-
fining those claimed violations to (i) sheath temperature, 
(ii) continous flow of voltage, (iii) KW capacity of the 
heaters and (iv) delivery time. All these matters concerned 
only the 15 and 21 KW heaters. 
Finding No. 17 merely alleges generally and un-
specifically "defective" heater assemblies. The alleged "de-
fects" are not pointed out. It is impossible to determine 
what precisely the Court had in mind. 
Finding No. 18 omits the substantial, unrefuted and 
irrefutable evidence of the unreliability of Mallory's tests. 
They were performed with improperly calibrated instruments 
based on no certificate of calibration (T. 49, 56, 58-60, 
63, 505-506); with make-shift graph paper not intended for 
the testing instrument used (T. 57-58); with some thermostats ' 
bypassed (T. 51, 60); with other thermostats ruined by the 
heat caused by welding. (~ 175, 506-510, 516-518) Mallory's 
story of 500°F. heat is incredible (T. 509-510, 513-514), 
because it means that not one of the 18 thermostats, installed \ 
' by Valad in the heaters, functioned to cut off the current 
at 250°F., at which all the thermostats were (without contra-
dietary evidence) set. (T. 509, 513) The KW capacity is a 
function of sheath surface area. (T. 383-384, 154-155) The 
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Valad drawings (Ex. 20) annotated by Nyman showed that sheath 
area, the formula for which Nyman knew (T. 373-374, 378-379, 
383-384) when he approved the drawings in Exhibit 20 (83). 
Finding No. 22 is both incomplete and erroneous. 
The sheath temperature could not possibly have been above 
250°F., if Mallory had not damaged or bypassed the 18 reliable 
Rance thermostats with which Valad had equipped the heaters. 
It is physically impossible for all 18 thermostats to have 
failed when 225°F. was reached. Nor were these heaters de~ 
fective or in violation of the contract to sell or of the 
"Certificates of Certification." 
Finding No. 23 alleges unspecifically that Valad did 
not meet the "required specifications" -- which ones the Court 
leaves to speculation. Valad complied with the approved 
structural drawings in Exhibit 20 (83). (T. 429-430) 
Finding No. 24 assumes that Valad had a contractual 
duty to supply replacement heaters gratis. No such duty can 
be discovered in the contract to sell· (Ex. 20) The Findings 
pay no attention to the relevant fact that the Regan heaters 
(which were ordered by Mallory purchase orders) specified 
watt density. The Brown and Mallory purchase orders did 
not do so. (Exs. 9, 10, and 11; T. 91, 170-172, 526; Exs. 39-41) 
G. 
Conclusions of Law Nos. 3 and 4 state: "Valad 
breached its contracts ... ", as if there were more than one 
contract! Nowhere in the Findings or Conclusions did the 
Trial Court: Identify these contracts; describe how they 
were formed; state who made the offers and who the acceptances; 
affirm whether they were contracts of sale or contracts to 
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sell; recite their terms; aver that they were written or oral; 
cite or exhibit a specific writing competent to serve as the 
basic written contract; or, if oral, explain away the applic-
able Statute of Frauds. The conclusion that "Valad breached 
its contracts" thus has no factual or legal premise. 
The evidence establishes that Valad built the 15 
and 21 KW heaters in meticulous compliance with the structural 
drawings (Ex. 20 or 83) approved by Brown. There was, there-
fore, no breach of any contract by Valad. 
Assuming breach, arguendo, the conclusion of ind:irect 
damages of $30,840.60 is legal error, as shown in Point VII 
infra. 
Conclusion of Law No. 5 states: "Mallory is en-
titled to judgment against Valad for ... damages to Mallory 
sustained being a Third Party Beneficiary of the contract of 
sale ... " This conclusion is legal error on two scores: 
There was no contract of sale; there was only a contract to 
sell, in view of the UCC. In the second place, Mallory was 
not, as a matter of law, a "third party beneficiary." 
H. 
Mallory's complaint purports to allege three causes 
of action against Brown and Valad. The first cause of action 
does not mention, refer to or intimate any contract between 
Brown and Valad. Nor does it state any cause of action 
against Valad. Its sole reference to Valad (R. 2 •3l merely 
states that Valad "is a New York Corporation with its princi· 
pal place of business in Tarrytown, Westchester County, New 
York." 
The second cause of action also fails to allege or 
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mention any contract between Brown and Valad. It refers, 
however, to Valad's "Certificates of Certification" (Exs. 22 
and 23) dated March 13, 1973 which were sent to Mallory 
(and Brown) long after the contract to sell between Brown 
and Valad (Ex. 20) dated January 26, 1973, had been con-
eluded. These "certificates" are discussed below. 
The third cause of action also fails to allege or 
mention any contract between Brown and Valad. The record 
and Mallory's responses to interrogatories show there never 
was any contract relationship between Valad and Mallory 
respecting the 15 and 21 KW heaters, and no theory of "third 
party beneficiary" appears anywhere in the complaint. 
I. 
The documentary supplements to the complaint, such 
as Mallory's "Response" to Valad's request for production of 
documents show the bankruptcy of Mallory's claims. In the 
answer to Valad's demand No. 1 that Mallory produce "copy of 
any and all papers comprising a contract between Defendant 
Brown and Plaintiff [Mallory]", the latter answered on Octo-
ber 28, 1975: 
The papers comprising the contract between 
Defendant Brown and Plaintiff consist of 
the following, copies of which are attached: 
(a) Mallory P.O. 4016; (b) Mallory P.O. 
4047; and (c) Mallory P.O. 4041. (R. 211) 
But they were neither signed nor accepted by Valad. Plaintiff 
never even alleged that they were. 
Valad's Request No. 2 required Mallory to produce 
"each and every paper, if there be more than one, which sets 
forth any contract which Mallory alleges existed between 
Mallory and Valad." (R. 211) Mallory answered: 
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There was never a direct contract between 
Mallory and Valad, except for the guarantee 
and certification expressly requested from 
Valad by Mallory and these written guaran-
tees and certifications are dated March 13, 
1973 and pertain to the 15 and 21 KW heaters, 
=pies of which are attached hereto. (R. 212) 
Mallory contends that its unaccepted purchase orders 
in some way constitute a contract between Brown and Valad! 
Clearly, however, the purchase orders were not accepted and 
did not constitute a contract with Valad. 
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POINT III 
TIME WAS NOT OF THE ESSENCE 
IN EITHER MALLORY'S CONTRACT 
WITH BROWN OR BROWN'S WITH 
VALAD; THERE WAS NO FIRM OR 
FIXED DATE OF DELIVERY; AND 
THERE WAS NO BREACH OF CONTRACT 
BY VALAD BECAUSE OF LATE DELIV-
ERY. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS 
AND CONCLUSIONS ON DELIVERY HAVE 
NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL FOUNDATION; 
AND MALLORY IS EQUITABLY ESTOPPED 
FROM PRESSING ITS FALSE CONTEN-
TION OF LEGALLY LATE DELIVERY. 
The Court found in part that Valad breached its 
contract with Brown, and was thus liable to Mallory under 
the third party beneficiary theory (Conclusions of Law No. 
5), because the heaters were late (Finding of Fact No. 15), 
and because Valad did not take corrective action. (Finding 
of Fact Nos. 23 and 24) Mallory received the 12, 15 and 
21 KW heaters (T. 36-37), found satisfactory and used the 
12 KW heater (T. 189-190), and eventually alleged the 15 and 
21 KW heaters to be unsatisfactory. (T. 39) The 36 and 50 
KW heaters were never shipped due to Mallory's repudiation 
(see Point IV). The Trial Court apparently believed the 
questionable testimony of Mallory's President, Lee Farber, 
that "time was of the essence" on all of the orders for all 
the heaters. The Plaintiff then calculated the alleged 
indirect damages, based upon the "delay" figured from six 
weeks after the dates of Mallory's purchase orders. (Exs. 
100 and 102, and Ex. A of the Findings) 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law seriously 
misapply the law to the facts, have no substantial support in 
the evidence, and constitute reversible error. R. C. Tolman 
Co., Inc., v. Mighton Water Assoc., 563 P. 2d 780 (Utah 1977); 
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Brown v. Board of Education in Morgan County School District, 
560 P. 2d 1129 (Utah 1977). 
Delivery Times of Heaters 
Finding of Fact No. 15 reflects the following time 
schedule alleged by Plaintiff on the basis of offers (purchase 
orders) which Valad did not accept with respect to various 
heaters: 
INITIAL UNAC-
ITEM CEPTED OFFER* 
15 and 21 P.O. 4016 
KW Heaters 12/14/72 
(Job 281) (Ex. 9) 
21 KW P.O. 6730 
Heater 12/15/72 
(Job 281) (Ex. 10) 
15 KW Letter 
Heater 12/20/72 
(Job 281) (Ex. 11) 
12 and 50 P.O. 4047 
KW Heaters 12/26/72 
(Job 277) (Ex. 12) 
12 and 50 P.O. 6754 
KW Heaters 1/03/73 
(Job 277) (Ex. 13) 
36 KW P.O. 4241 
Heater 2/08/73 
(Job 285) (Ex. 14) 
36 KW P.O. 7269 
Heater 2/07/73 
(Job 285) (Ex. 15) 
SENT 
FROM/TO 
Mallory 
to 
Brown 
Brown 
to 
Val ad 
Brown 
to 
Val ad 
Mallory 
to 
Brown 
Brown 
to 
Val ad 
Mallory 
to 
Brown 
Brown 
to 
Va lad 
ALLEGED 
DELIVERY TH'i.E 
"delivery guaranteed 
within 
6 weeks ARO" 
"when ship-1/24/73, 
or before" 
NO DATE ALLEGED 
NO DATE ALLEGED 
"when ship--ASAP" 
NO DATE ALLEGED 
"when ship--ASAP--
6 weeks or before" 
* None of these offers were ever accepted. See Point II 
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The Applicable Statutes 
The Uniform Commercial Code provides that the time 
for shipment or delivery where not provided or agreed upon is 
a "reasonable time". 701<-2-309 (1) What constitutes a. 
reasonable time "depends on the nature, purpose and circum-
stances of such action". 70A-l-204(2) A time requirement 
m~y be waived. 70A-2-209(4) It may be modified by the par-
ties (70A-2-209) or repudiated by the buyer, giving the 
aggrieved party the right to suspend performance. 70A-2-610 
Unsupported Computation of Delayed Time 
Finding No. 25 and Exhibit A to the Findings alleg-
edly reflect the "total delayed time" in days for each heater. 
On P.O. 4016, the time was computed from January 25, 1973, 
the claimed "delivery date", through June 8, 1973, when the 
"cover" heaters ordered from another manufacturer were 
installed, a total of 133 days. (Plaintiff's "Itemization of 
Damages", Ex. 100 and 102) Similarly, Mallory calculated 
"indirect damages" for 112 days on P.O. 4047 and 70 days on 
P.O. 4241. Id. 
No Delivery Date Specified 
Mallory's P.O. 4047 and 4241 are undated as to 
delivery time. The finding of the Court that these heaters 
were late is unsupported by the record and evidence. 
The Court accepted Mallory's ipse dixit testimony 
about delivery time six weeks from the dates of Mallory's 
purchase orders. (P.O. 4047 and 4241) This was contrary to 
the evidence. For example, Interrogatory No. 9, Valad's 
First Set of Interrogatories to Mallory (R. 185) , asked 
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Mallory to "specify the commitment or commitments which 
Plaintiff claims Valad violated". Farber's answer, based 
on the false claim that Valad had accepted the purchase 
orders, was as follows: 
Mallory P.O. 4016 stipulates a guaranteed 
delivery date "within 6 weeks ARO". Specific 
delivery dates were not specified on Mallory 
P.O. 4047 and 4241, but it was a general 
understanding with the Ted R. Brown C'o. that 
Valad had intended to provide heaters in 
sufficient time to permit orderly contract 
completion without contract modification for 
consideration. (emphasis added) (R. 297) 
When Mallory's Farber was pressed for an explanation 
as to what constituted the "general understanding" at trial 
(T. 193-4), he admitted the following: 
A. Brown's P.O. 6754 is not so explicit in 
that it just says "ASAP". But Brown 
understood, which is the reason for my 
saying "generally understood", that time 
was of the essence on all of these projects. 
Q. Why do you say Brown understood it since 
you are speaking of the understanding of 
someone else? Is there something they 
said to you that indicated that? 
A. When I say Brown understood, I meant specif-
ically Mr. Nyman understood that time was of 
the essence. 
Q. But my question is why do you say he under-
stood it? How do you know he understood it? 
A. I assume he understood it. (emphasis added) 
(T. 194) 
The Court based its damage award on Farber's unrevealed 
assumption, of which Valad knew nothing. This is manifest 
error. 
Waiver or Estoppel as to Time of Delivery Requirements 
The facts mandate a finding of waiver of delivery 
time requirements on all of the jobs. The law on waiver in 
commercial situations has been stated as follows: 
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It is sometimes indicated that where a buyer 
does not treat the contract as breached after 
delivery had been delayed beyond the time stip-
ulated, but evidences an intent to continue the 
contract in force, the buyer is deemed to waive 
the time limit for delivery and to permit deliv-
ery within a reasonable time thereafter ... the 
act of a buyer accepting the goods after a 
delay in delivery, with full knowledge thereof, 
has also been held to bar the buyer from refusing 
to pay or taking action to rescind or cancel the 
contract ... 
67 Am. Jur. 2d Sales, §330, pps. 469-70. (emphasis 
added) 
Since no particular provision of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code displaces the common law of waiver or estop-
pel, it is applicable in this case. U.C.A. 1953 §70A-l-103 
See also Clovis National Bank v. Thomas, 425 P. 2d 726 (N.M. 
196 7) . 
The following points, completely ignored by the 
Court in its findings, show waiver and demonstrate the gross 
misapplication of the law to the facts: 
1. MALLORY APPROVED THE CONSTRUCTION PLANS FOR THE 
15 AND 21 KW HEATERS ON OR ABOUT THE PURPORTED "TIME OF THE 
ESSENCE" DELIVERY DATE OF JANUARY 24, 1973. On the 15 and 21 
KW heaters, Mallory figured damages from January 24, 1973 
(Ex. 102, pg. 6), because the unaccepted P.O. 4016 dated 
December 14, 1972 (Ex. 9) purportedly allowed six weeks for 
delivery. Valad's customer, Ted R. Brawn and Associates, 
received P.O. 4016 from Mallory, sent its own purchase orders 
to Valad, received Valad's construction drawings, and returned 
to Valad a Jan. 26, 1973 dated "speed letter" with the approved 
construction drawings. (Exs. 20, 55, and 83; T. 35, 221-22, 
275 and 411) In other words, this speed letter was not even 
mailed to Valad until at least two days after (!) Mallory's 
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alleged "time of the essence" delivery date, January 24th. 
(Ex . 10 2 , p • 6 ) 
Knowledge of Delay at Time of Approval 
The strongest evidence of Mallory's waiver of any 
specific delivery time on the heaters represented by P.O. 
4016 is the undisputed fact tlat only a few days before the 
Jan. 26, 1973 "speed letter" to Valad (Exs. 20 and 83), 
Mallory approved the shop drawings. Exhibit 20 itself 
recites that "The drawings 73-119 and 73-120 ... have been 
reviewed by Mallory Engineering and approved ... " Since the 
drawings referred to were only sent to Mallory by Valad on 
January 19th (Dwg. 73-119 - 21 KW, Ex. 17) and January 22nd 
(Dwg. 73-120 - 15 KW, Ex. 18), this "review" and "approval" 
--especially with mailing time--must have occured around 
January 24th through January 25th. (T. 180-1) Thus, Mallory 
had to know at the time of said approval that construction 
could not even begin until after the alleged "time of the 
essence" deli very date. Yet Mallory still, curiously, claims 
damages on the 15 and 21 KW heaters from January 24th. Valad 
was lulled into proceeding with manufacture and Mallory should 
be estopped to claim late delivery. 
2. MALLORY'S ALLEGED DAMAGES DON'T COINCIDE WITH 
THE ALLEGED DELAYS. With respect to the damages due to alleged 
"lateness" of delivery, Farber testified: 
The heaters started to cause me troubles when 
they were not delivered after January 29, 1973,* 
which was the guaranteed delivery date that I 
would get the heaters ... And for the period of 
February, March and April this heater problem 
*This is probably reporter error since Farber consistent!: 
testified that January "24", 1973, was the guaranteed delive0 
date. 
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80ntributed significantly to the inability of 
Mallory Engineering to meet its obligations. 
(T. 740) 
It is terribly inconsistent for Mallory to claim damages 
during February, March and April, when by Farber's own 
testimony, Mallory's approval of Valad's shop drawings could 
not have reached Valad until January 28 or 29, 1973. Also, 
Mallory did not even issue P.O. 4241 (36 KW heaters, no 
delivery date specified) until February 8, 1973. Thus, 
Mallory's damage claims simply find no support in the evidence. 
3. MALLORY DID NOT PROTEST "DELAYS". Mallory's 
lack of protest or objection was a tacit, or implicit waiver 
of any requirement of delivery by January 24, 1973, giving 
rise to equitable estoppel. In fact, in his testimony about 
the receipt and delivery of the 15 and 21 KW heaters (P.O. 
4016), Farber stated: 
I don't recall specifically whether it's a 
15 or 21 KW heater, was delivered in early 
March of 1973. The second two sets of that 
heater as I recall were delivered March 19, 
1973. (emphasis added) (T. 713) ~~­
It's my recollection that we received Valad 
heaters in two separate shipments - two or 
three shipments. I'm not exactly--two I'm 
positive of, in March of 1973. (emphasis 
added) (T. 36) --
There is absolutely no testimony or showing of protest based 
on late delivery until late April when Farber finally tele-
phoned Valad. (T. 241, 75, 415) 
4. MALLORY'S REQUEST FOR THE CERTIFICATES OF CERT-
IFICATION SHOWS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PURPORTED LACK OF TIMELINESS. 
Mallory's waiver of late delivery is implicit in its request 
for the "certificates of certification" (Exs. 22 and 23), 
accepted without protest in the middle of March, 1973. (T. 
105,ln. 29) The certificates were dated March 13, 1973. 
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(T. 38, 105, 134, 135) All of the heaters were received 
by mid-March on Farber's own calculations (T. 36, 38, 713; 
Exs. 100, 102), yet the record shows no protest, objection, 
demand or claim of delay until early May. This is a clear 
waiver of firm delivery dates, and Mallory should be estopped 
from claiming that time was of the essence! 
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POINT IV 
MALLORY ACCEPTED THE HEATERS 
WITHOUT ANY VALID REJECTION. 
MALLORY ALSO UNLAWFULLY REPUDI-
ATED THE CONTRACT BETWEEN BROWN 
AND VALAD. BROWN PARTICIPATED 
IN THAT ILLEGAL REPUDIATION. 
MOREOVER, MALLORY, IN CONCERT 
WITH BROWN, UNLAWFULLY REJECTED 
THE 15 KW AND 21 KW HEATERS, 
WHICH CONFORMED EXACTLY WITH 
BROWN'S SPECIFICATIONS, AS SHOWN 
IN POINTS II, V AND VI HEREIN. 
The Utah Uniform Commercial Code provides that 
acceptance occurs if any of three conditions arises, when 
the buyer: 
(a) 
(bl 
(cl 
after a reasonable opportunity to inspect 
the goods signifies to the seller that the 
goods are conforming or that he will retain 
them in spite of their non~conformity; or 
fails to make an effective rejection ... ; or 
does any act inconsistent with the seller's 
ownership •.. ; U.C.A. 1953 §70A-2-606. 
In the event that the goods are deemed non-conforming, 
the buyer (Mallory) must "reject" the goods under the Code, 
as provided in §70A-2-602. Rejection must be within a 
reasonable time after delivery and it is ineffective unless 
the buyer (Brown) "seasonably" notified the seller (Val ad) . 
70A-2-602(1) Furthermore, any exercise of ownership by 
the buyer with respect to the goods after rejection is wrong-
ful. If the buyer takes possession of the goods before 
rejection, he is under a duty after rejection to use reasonable 
care in storing or handling them. 70A-2-602(2) (a) and (bl 
In addition, the buyer must specify in connection with the 
rejection a particular defect ascertainable by reasonable 
inspection to later justify the rejection where the seller 
(Valad) could have cured said defect if the buyer (Mallory) 
had stated it seasonably. 70A-2-605 
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The cited law was either ignored or seriously mis-
applied by the Court, thus constituting reversible error. 
Mallory's Acceptance 
The Valad packing slips show that the 15 and 21 KW 
heaters were shipped in March (Exs. 36 and 37), and Farber 
testified that they were installed in late March and April of 
1973. (T. 37-8) Because the heaters were received both in 
early March (T. 713) and late March (T. 36), Mallory must 
have been in possession of the heaters for two to three weeks 
before they were finally installed. (T. 37-8) The waiting 
period plus the eventual installation certainly constitute 
acceptance under 70A-2-605 and 606, since Mallory had "reason-
able opportunity to inspect the goods." 
No Revocation Of Acceptance 
There was no revocation of acceptance after dis-
covery of any "alleged" defect under 70A-2-608 (1) (b). The 
test performed by Mallory after the units were installed 
(T. 39, ls. 14-26, T. 126), could have easily been performed 
prior to the installation. (T. 217-18; 505-511, 513) In 
fact, the Stabro lab tests conducted immediately prior to 
the trial and more than two-and-a-half years after the 
tests done by Mallory, showed how quickly the test could be 
made and also exhibit results similar to the Mallory tests, 
{T. 86-7, 593, Ex. 38) Thus, if Mallory had acted reason-
ably, assuming arguendo that the heaters were non-conforming, 
the nonconformity could have been discovered prior to in-
stallation. {T. 39-40, 86-88) Thus, there could be no 
revocation of acceptance under law. 
Furthermore, under 70A-2-608(2), Mallory could not 
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revoke its acceptance after the discovery in late April, 1975, 
of the alleged non-conformity, because the revocation must 
"occur within a reasonable time after the buyer ... should have 
discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change 
in condition of the goods ... " (Emphasis added) Mallory 
should have discovered the alleged defect in late March or 
early April when the heaters were received. For reasons known 
only to itself, it did not discover the alleged defects until 
the latter part of April. (T. 241, 75, 414) 
By installing the heaters prior to the tests, Mallory 
also caused a "substantial changa in the condition of the goods" 
since they could not be removed without destruction. (T. 69-
71); 70A-2-608(2) Later, the heaters were in fact destroyed 
in removal, a fact known in advance of installation by Mal-
lory. (T. 69-71) Thus, their installation in the first 
instance was an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership, 
foreclosing revocation under still another code section. 
70A-2-606(1) (c) Thus, there was no valid revocation of ac-
ceptance by Mallory. 
No Effective Rejection By Mallory 
70A-2-606(1) (bl provides that the buyer has ac-
cepted goods unless he makes effective rejection pursuant 
to 70A-2-602(1). Mallory made an ineffectual attempt at 
rejection, after various conversations in early May, culmin-
ating in the Mailgram of rejection (as well as repudiation) 
addressed to Valad on May 8, 1973. (T. 81-2, Ex. 35) Even 
if Mallory's oral rejection came a day or two before the writ-
ten rejection, as mentioned in the Mailgram (Ex. 35), it 
still occured almost two months after the first shipment of 
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heaters, and forty days after the second shipment. It also 
occured long after installation. However, 70A-2-602(1) re-
quires the following: 
Rejection of goods must be within a reasonable 
time after their delivery or tender.· It is in-
effective unless the buyer seasonably notifies--
the seller. (Emphasis added) 
Forty days to two months after delivery is certainly not 
reasonable time for rejection. This is especially so for 
alleged defects that could have been discovered upon testing 
on arrival (and before installation). (T. 39-40, 86-88) 
Mallory Repudiated The Contract, 
Thus Substantially Impairing The Value 
Of Said Contract To Valad, Resulting In 
Valad's Suspension Of Performance. 
The Uniform Commercial Code provides in 70A-2-610 
as follows: 
Anticipatory repudiation--when either party 
repudiates the contract with respect to a 
performance not yet due, the loss of which 
will substantially impair the value of the 
contract to the other, the aggrieved party 
may ... (cl suspend his own performance. 
A± the time of repudiation (T. 81-2, Ex. 35), on May 8, 1973, 
Mallory had no idea whether the unshipped, unmanufactured 
36 and 50 KW heaters would be conforming, or for that matter, 
could be made or altered to conform to Mallory's subjective 
desires. Thus, Mallory's repudiation was totally unjustified. 
Mallory's repudiation substantially impaired the 
value of the contract to Valad since Mallory made a clear 
statement with Ex. 35 that it did not interrl to continue the 
I 
contract and would secure what, in its opinion, were conforminc ! 
heaters elsewhere. This statement by Mallory gave rise to 
Valad's rightful suspension of its performance on P.O.'s 4047 
and 4241. 
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Even Assuming That Vcilad's Performance Was 
Late With Respect tc Deliv2ry, Such Is Excused. 
'rhe Uniform Connnercial Code provides that: 
Delay in delivery or non-delivery ... is not a 
breach of his (seller's) duty ... if performance 
as agreed has been made impracticable by the 
occurence of a contingency, the non-occurence 
of which was a basic assumption upon which the 
contract was made ... §70A-2-615 
Valad's Cecchini testified about a letter dated 
March 27, 1973, wherein Valad explained that it was then en-
countering some unanticipated labor difficulties which resulted 
in a serious slow-down in the plant. (T. 426, Ex. 58) Farber 
ccknow~dged having received said letter, wherein the labor 
problems were explained. His own testimony suggested that 
Mallory asked Cecchinito send it. (T. 748, Ex. 104) More 
importantly, Mallory acknowledged that it actually used this 
letter to attempt to get extensions from the Government 
(T. 191-2) for its own delays! Thus, it is hard to under-
stand Mallory's contention that it was damaged by the late 
shipment of heaters when it used the lateness to its own ad-
vantage and obtained contract extensions. Valad is excused 
because of the labor problems; and Mallory is estopped to claim 
delay in delivery. 
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POINT V 
DURING THE TRIAL MALLORY'S PRESIDENT, 
FARBER, REPEATEDLY CONFUSED HIMSELF, 
THE TRIAL COURT AS WELL AS THE ISSUES 
IN THE CASE BY TENDENTIOUSLY USING, 
AS IF THEY WERE PART OF AN AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN VALAD AND BROWN OR BETWEEN 
MALLORY AND VALAD, THE FOLLOWING 
WORDS OR PHRASES: "CAPACITY", "DEN-
SITY" I "LIMITSTATS" I "SPECIFICATIONS" 
(IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS) I "DESIGN" I 
II PURCHASE ORDERS II (MALLORY Is AND 
BROWN'S) I "PERFORMANCE STANDARDS II I 
"CONTINUOUS FULL VOLTAGE", HIS 
"TESTS", AND "APPROVED FOR SIZE 
ONLY". ACTUALLY, THESE WORDS AND 
PHRASES AS USED BY FARBER WERE RELE-
VANT ONLY TO HIS OWN PARTISAN PUR-
POSES AS A WITNESS. THEY WERE NOT 
RELEVANT TO THE ONLY CONTRACT TO SELL 
(EXHIBIT 83) IN THE CASE. 
-
First, it must be re-emphasized that there was no 
contract between Mallory and Valad. This has been thoroughly 
discussed in Point II above. 
1. No purchase order, whether Mallory's or Brown's, 
was ever part of the contract between Brown and Valad, either 
e:<plici tly or by incorporation by reference. The Mallory and 
Brown purchase orders were not explicit or detailed enough to 
tell Valad exactly what Brown wanted to buy from Valad. The 
purch~se orders simply served to begin discussions between 
Brown and Valad. These discussions quickly abandoned the 
i 
purchase orders and replaced them eventually with shop drawings. 
These drawings form the basis for the agreement between Valad I 
and Brown since they were, by Brown, "approved for construe-
tion". The purchase orders were never relevant to the actual 
agreement since they were only part of the preliminary nego-
tiations which led to the contract. 
Neither Brown nor Malloryat any tim0 ever explicitly 
contended that any of their purchase orders had ever been 
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accepted by Valad. No offer by Brown was ever accepted by 
Valad (T. 429-430, 436-496) until it accepted Nyman's modifi-
cations noted in Exhibit 83 (20). This exhibit comprised 
Nyman's speedletter and Valad's two shop drawings, numbered 
73-119 and 73-120, and annotated in Nyman's handwriting. 
(T. 35-36, 442, 452-453, 493-494) Exhibit 83 (20) confirms 
the testimony of Cecchini (T. 425-426, 429, 431-432, 453, 475-
476, 481-482, 493) and Mccarron (T. 543-544) to the effect 
that these shop drawings were structural specifications to 
guide and control Valad's manufacture of the heaters ordered 
by Brown in the drawings "approved for construction". 
2. Thus, the only contract between Brown and Valad 
(E~~. 83) included approved drawings which themselves dictated 
the design of the heaters. (T. 424-432, 481, 493, 495) Be-
cause the drawings were approved, the controversy in the record 
about who had the duty to design the heaters is irrelevant. 
(T. 189, 104-105, 141, 174, 188-189, 426-427, 429-431) After 
receiving Brown's purchase orders, Valad eventually "developed 
a drawing". (T. 481) Then, "it was up to Mallory or to 
Brown ... to approve the heaters or not approve the heaters" as 
sketched in the shop drawings. (T. 482) In Mallory's Answers 
to Valad's Interrogatories, Farber admitted that he had ap-
proved the Valad drawings contained in Exhibit 83 (20): 
... Lee Farber reviewed these drawings in 
detail with Mr. Nyman, who made notations 
on these drawings and returned them to 
Valad, "approved for construction subject 
to comments made". (R. 307) 
3. Exhibit 83 sets forth no performance standards, 
as is clear from its contents (T. 543-544); despite Farber's 
preoccupation with that concept during his testimony. How a 
device, pictured on a drawing board, will (i.e., after con-
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struction and after insertion in undescribed environmental 
chambers) eventually function is always problematical. Only 
actual tests or trial-runs in loco can disclose accurately the 
device's performance data. Nyman confirmed this (T. 279-80) 
in testimony quoted infra in section 10. 
It is an almost universal practice for all manufac-
turers of successful, time-tested products to manufacture 
three types or classes thereof, exactly as Valad does. (T. 326- 1 
330) The first class constitutes stock items, mass-produced, 
repetitive as advertised in catalogues. For these Valad sub-
mi ts a price quotation to be either accepted or rejected by 
the customer. Its guarantee covers heat production, limited 
by thermostat, workmanship and materials. (T. 426-427, 436) 
The second class is a modified version of the first class. 
Valad submits a shop drawing and quotation which the customer 
either accepts or rejects. (T. 530, 542) If the customer 
accepts, it must approve the shop drawing before Valad manu-
factures. (T. 427-430, 436-437, 475-476, 492-496) Here 
Valad guarantees conforrni ty with the approved drawing. (T. 425- i 
430, 437, 452, 475, 481-482, 492-493, 495-496, 524-530) The 
third class of product manufactured by Valad is designed and 
invented to meet the customer's special requirements. (T. 524, ! 
537) It is not a mere modification of the stock items. This 
third-class device requires from Valad invention, experimen-
tation, and testing in the exact location and environment 
wherein the customer wishes to utilize it. It requires, es-
pecially, production of a costly prototype which 1akes the 
place of a drawing and which is approved, if it is successful, 
by the customer in writing. If it is not approved, the cus-
tomer pays for all work up to that time. Valad's guarantee 
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explicitly and in writing covers performance such as was 
rendered by the tested prototype. (T. 427-428, 431, 437, 
481, 524-525) 
Nyman selected heaters from Valad's catalogue and 
simply wanted a modified model of Valad's stock items. There 
never was any talk of a tested prototype. Valad never did 
and never could guarantee capability of a heater to perform 
in unknown governmental equipment. (T. 431) At no time did 
Nyman ever supply to Valad density requirements which would 
be essential to a warranty of performance in a particular 
manner. (T. 431-445, 155, 172, 213-214) Eventually, Nyman 
asked Valad to construct in accordance with approved and 
annotated drawings. (Ex. 83; T. 447, 451-452) 
Mallory's alleged "performance standards" (Ex. 4) 
were on their face incomplete. Furthermore, Exhibit 4 was 
never given to Valad and constituted no part of the sole 
agreement (Ex. 83) between Valad and Brown. 
4. A specific density factor was indeed implicit 
in the structural drawings. (Ex. 83) It was readily com-
putable from the data set forth in those annotated structural 
drawings, which the parties had "approved for construction". 
Those shop drawings in Exhibit 83 are not consistent with any 
other density requirement. 
Q: ... Mallory never provided any para-
meter for watts per square inch at any 
time; is that it? 
A: ... No. No, we don't have that capa-
bility on the cartridge heaters. 
Q: I see, but it is an essential para-
meter for manufacture and design of the 
heater? 
A: Absolutely essential. 
Q: -- It does not appear on your purchase 
order, does it? 
A. It does not. 
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Q: Even though it is essential, as you say. 
A: Yes. (T. 157) 
Incidentally, Nyman used the wrong figure to com-
pute watt density during his testimony. He used 3.57 square 
inches per lineal inch, instead of 3.07, the correct constant. 
(T. 371, 372-375, 377) 
5. Exhibit 83 (20) contains no language which 
explicitly calls for a mathematically precise electric capaci~ 
or its equivalent heat capacity; except within the ranges of 
electric voltages (which vary from time to time) supplied by 
the public utility (whose electricity cannot always be pro-
duced at targeted voltage); and except within the tolerance 
allowed to electrical devices by the National Fire Underwrit-
ters Code (herein sometimes "Code" or "Safety Code"). On 
this point, McCarron's testimony was uncontradicted. (T. 530-
532) 
6. The "specifications" in Mallory's government 
contracts (which Valad never saw, and of which it was never 
informed) are not found in Exhibit 83. The Trial Court 
admitted these government specifications not to show their 
nature or essentials but merely to demonstrate the existence 
of Mallory's contracts with the government. (T. 6-7, 10, 
13, 18-23, 185, 169) 
7. Farber made much of his bizarre interpretation 
(T. 39, 42, 67-68, 153-154) of the following sentence ex-
cerpted from Mallory's unaccepted purchase order (which 
never was part of any contract between Brown and Valad) : 
... the sheath temperature will not exceed 
+250°F. when operating at continuous full 
voltage and a maximum air temperature of 
+160°F. with an air velocity of 5 FPS. (Ex. 9) 
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He claimed to believe that the quoted language bespeaks a 
requirement that the heater must operate continuously "at 
continuous full voltage." (T. 39, 42, 153-154; but see 
371-374, 418, 533, 566) Neither the purchase order nor its 
quoted specification appear in the contract between the parties. 
(Exs. 83 and 20) Therefore, they are no part of any agreement 
between Valad and Brown. 
Secondly, the quotation does not say the heater 
must always be heating; it merely says that when it is heating 
or operating, the sheath temperature must not exceed +25Q°F. 
Thirdly, continuous operation of the heater (as distinguished 
from "continuous full voltage" when the heater is operating) 
is belied by the government specifications, which speak of 
"de-energizing the heating system" and of a "hi-low control-
ler ... which would de-energize both the heating and cooling 
systems". Fourthly, the patent presence of many thermostats 
(required by the relevant Safety Code) on the shop drawings 
in Exhibit 83 necessarily calls for interruption of elec-
tricity whenever the temperature reached +250°F., at which 
the thermostats were set. 
8. Farber tried repeatedly (T. 51-54, 169, 122-
123) to distinguish between "limitstats" or thermostats used 
as fail-safe devices on the one hand and temperature control 
built into the structure of the heater, on the other. He 
claimed that only the latter had his approval. The indisputable 
proof, however, is that the shop drawings in Exhibit 83 did 
receive his approval. Those drawings unmistakably depicted 
eighteen thermostats, whose inevitable function it was to 
interrupt the electrical current when the thermostatic sensors 
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show +250°F.* In any event, the tenuous distinction which 
Farber, the witness, tried to make is not to be found in the 
only contract (Ex. 83) between Valad and Brown. Indeed, it is 
not even stated in any purchase orders prepared by Mallory or 
Brown; and of course no such purchase orders were ever accepted 
by Valad or constituted parts of Exhibit 83. 
9. The Trial Court stated irrelevantly**: "Mallory ' 
didn't get what they thought they were going to get ... the 
thermostats were put in there in such a manner that there was 
going to be an interrupted flow of current and not continuous ... 1 
(T. 620) Nothing could show more cogently the Trial Court's 
confusion. What Mallory thought they were going to get is not 
the question here. It is true that the thermostats were put 
in the heaters in such a manner that there was going to be an 
interrupted flow of current. But that was required not only by 
the Safety Code but also by the shop drawings in Exhibit 83, I 
I 
which the Trial Court completely neglected both during the trial 
! 
and in its Findings of Fact. Indeed, the Trial Court completeJ:·' 
neglected all facts relating to contract formation in the case. 
The Judge's remarks show that he was adrift in Farber's confu-
sions about the real issue. 
It is clear, too, that the Trial Court did not con-
sider relevant Farber's confusion on the question whether Brown 
had followed instructions in giving data to Valad. (T. 97, 108.j 
137-9) 
*Actually, the thermostats were set at +225°F. to insure a 
sheath no hotter than +250 °. (T. 50 8-9) 
**At the end of Mccarron' s testimony, the Trial Court aske:' 
another irrelevant question (T. 561) about Valad's capability t: 
build, from "proper specifications", a heater whose sheath temc· · 
erature would not exceed +250°F. He still refused to recognize 
Exhibit 83. 
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This has a massive bearing on exactly what "Mallory thought 
they were going to get" (to use the Trial Court's comment). 
When shown Exhibit 20 (Ex. 83) at Trial, Farber testified: 
A: ... If Nyman's written instructions 
pertaining to the use of thermostats is 
interpreted to be the method of limiting 
sheath temperature, then it is not cor-
rect ... To the best of my capability, I 
am saying right now if Nyman is directincr 
Valad to use thermostats as the means -
of limiting sheath temperature, it is 
not correct. 
Q: [Mr. Tibbals] Is there any language 
there that is amenable to such an ~n­
terpretation. 
A: There could be. 
Q: How? 
A: Let me read, "Since each insert will 
have three stats, three thermostats are 
required for a total of 9 for each set. 
This is detailed in your December 22, 
1972 letter." (T. 119; Ex. 83) 
Thus, Farber admits that Brown gave Valad wrong instructions 
in Brown's unaccepted purchase order. In any event, Exhibit 
83 calls for thermostats "to limit the sheath temperature". 
(T. 548) 
10. Both Nyman and Mallory alleged that the approval 
"for construction" was only an approval "for size". Of course, 
Exhibit 83 makes no such distinction. Nyman's notations over 
his own signature on the shop drawings in that Exhibit state 
explicitly that the drawing was "approved for construction 
subject to comments made" in the speedletter and in the an-
notations on the drawing. (T. 339, 399, 401-402, 411) 
Nyman's language in the speedletter, dated January 26, 1973, 
is even more explicit: "Please proceed with immediate pro-
duction ... " (Ex. 83) Actually, as that Exhibit shows, both 
its drawings were marked in Nyman's handwriting "approved for 
construction". No such limitations as "approved for size only" 
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.. 
appears anywhere in Exhibit 83. 
Nyman's approval of the structural drawings in 
Exhibit 83 became embarrassing to him during cross-examination, 1 
and he tried to rationalize: 
Q: And that was the structure that was 
approved by the drawing that you people 
signed; isn't that right? 
A: The only thing we approved, or that we 
sent back after discussions with Mallory 
was the fact that the heaters would be of 
a certain size. We had no way of examining 
them [in loco] for their capability of 
performing the criteria, however. 
[Neither did Valad!] 
*** Q: And the layout was approved for construction 
by you? 
A: That particular layout was, but without 
any possibility of analyzing the capability 
of that size unit to perform the job. 
Q: Did you add that qualification in any 
writing to Valad? 
A: No. We felt that there was no qualification 
to add since the particular criteria had 
been provided so that the heaters would do 
a particular job. (Emphasis added) (T. 279-280) 
But the "particular criteria" were not added to Brown's 
transmittal letter (Exs. 83 and 20); nor to the enclosed 
drawings; nor to any other contract to sell the involved 
"future goods" .. 
In other words, Nyman admits he approved a layout for 
size only without even knowing "the capability of that size 
unit to perform the job"! But he approved it. He ordered 
something without being concerned by its possible incapability. 
But he ordered it in his speed letter. (Exs. 20 and 83) He 
got what he approved and ordered. Now he wants to put blame 
on Valad. And the performance "criteria" (Ex. 4) he referred 
to were no part of any contract document signed by Brown or 
Valad. (T. 431, 432, 437, 481-2, 493, 495-6) Nyman's nota-
tions on the drawings and his speedletter (Exs. 20 and 83) 
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reveal no limitation of approval to size only. 
The shop drawings and speedletter obviously 
show much more than mere size or dimentional factors. The 
shop drawings themselves (numbered 73-119 and 73-120) in 
Exhibit 83 contradict Nyman; on their face and as annotated 
by Nyman himself, they reveal the following specifications in 
addition to dimensional requ~rements: 
A. Shop Drawing #73-119: 
(1) A total of three thermostats for each 
of three inserts; i.e., nine thermostats, 
whose sizes are not even mentioned. 
(2) These thermostats were to function 
"to limit to 250°F sheath temp." The 
(3) "customer does not want holes for 
mtg" [mounting] . 
(4) Compliance with "Class I, Group D" 
(of the National Fire Underwriters Code). 
(5) Heating by "steps" as numbered by Nyman. 
(6) The design and structure of the heater. 
(7) The number of its heating elements. 
(8) Fins on the elements. 
(9) Seals on the holes. 
(10) Number of "inserts" (two). 
(11) The requirement that the number of holes 
be kept to a minimum. 
(12) The KW factor. 
(13) The voltage factor. 
(14) The requirement of AC (alternating 
current). 
(15) The three phase ("PH") requirement. 
(16) The requirements "detailed in your 
[Valad's] December 22, 1972 letter" 
[Ex. 18]. 
(17) Requirement that the thermostats be set 
as high as possible but not to exceed 
250°F. 
(18) The comment that 200°F. is "much too low, 
since [the] entering air [in the duct] is 
200°F. in one case." 
(19) Mallory's wish to weld into duct and to 
seal and mount are noted. 
(20) The 13.875" and 14,375" "cutout." 
(21) "Approved for construction subject to 
comments as made". 
B. Shop Drawing #73-120: 
(1) A total of three thermostats for each of 
three inserts; i.e., nine thermostatS in 
all. 
(2) These thermostats were to limit sheath 
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temperature to 250°F. 
(3) No holes if possible; otherwise a mini-
mal number of holes. 
(4) Seals on each hole. 
(5) Compliance with "Class l, Group D" (of 
the Code). 
----
(6) Heating "steps" as numbered by Nyman, 
but different from the "steps" in Drawir.g 
#73-119. 
(7) The design and structure of the heater. 
(8) The design, structure and number of 
"inserts" (three). 
(9) The number of heating elements (six). 
(10) Fins on the elements. 
(11) Instructions about flanges, etc. 
(12) Valad must supply to Mallory a letter 
stating compliance with Class I, Group 
D, of the Code and-to be sent with ship-
ment. 
(13) Customer does not want three holes for 
the mounting ["mtg"] . 
(14) If Valad must use holes for attaching 
the terminal box, the holes must be 
sealed. 
(15) Three thermostats for each insert "to 
limit 250°F. sheath temp. since have 
3 steps". 
(16) "Approved for construction subject to 
comments as made." 
All these specifications in Exhibit 83 (20) demon-
strate Nyman's and Farber's manifest error in testifying that 
their "approved for construction" in Exhibit 83 was merely 
approval for size. 
Farber also perceived how damaging to his claim were 
the shop drawings approved by himself and Nyman. (T. 442, 452, 
493-4; Ex. 20) Farber was suddenly and conventiently disturbed 
(T. 32-3) by the very shop drawings (Exs. 83 and 20) which he 
had reviewed with Nyman (T. 106-7, 109-10, 118) before Nyman 
sent Exhibit 83 to Valad. The speedletter, itself, which is 
part of that Exhibit, states: "The drawings [73-119 and 73-
120] * * * have been reviewed by Mallory Engineering 
Besides, on instructions from Nyman (T. 402, 407), Valad had 
mailed Exhibits 17 and 18 directly to Farber. (T. 124-5) 
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Thus, neither Farber nor Nyman spoke the truth when 
they said the Valad shop drawings were approved for size only. 
Drawing #73-119 presented 21, and drawing #73-120 presented 16, 
non-dimentional requirements; and both showed the words: 
"approved construction". (Exs. 83 and 20) 
11. Valad's attorney questioned Mallory's Farber 
very closely on the testing procedures which, Farber claimed, 
showed that the heaters were deficient for the purposes of 
his Government contracts. Farber was extremely uncertain about 
some of the details of the tests. (T. 42-3) None of the 
instruments used by Mallory had been tested by the accepted 
method for fixing accuracy of calibration. (T. 49, 61) None 
of the instruments had a standard certificate traceable to the 
National Bureau of Standards' calibration (T. 49, 56) which is 
required for U. S. Government contracts. (T. 227-8) To 
accept Mallory's tests as reliable one would have to believe 
that not one single Rance thermostat (out of 18) , attached by 
Valad to the heaters "tested" by Mallory, worked! This is 
not only incredible, it is impossible. (T. 534, 549, 552) 
The charts used to record the test data did not have the proper 
grids. (T. 229-32) Nyman did not make any tests of his own, 
but relied completely on Farber's tests. (T. 342) 
Valad tested all of the heaters before they left 
the factory, in the presence of those testifying; and the 
results were recorded on instruments calibrated by the National 
Bureau of Standards. (T. 506, 515, 546-7, 568-9; Ex. 86) 
These results showed that all eighteen Rance thermostats* were 
*Valad in the previous 15 years had manufactured about 
1,000,000 heaters, all equipped with Rance thermostats (T. 504-5) 
without complaint. (T. 505-6, 507-10, 511, 513-4) 
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working properly. (T. 506, 508, 510, 549-50, 556) 
Mallory's Farber testified that immediately upon 
receipt of the heaters, they were inserted in the environmental 
chambers for testing purposes. (T. 39, 126) The heaters were 
installed by welding them in; but the thermostats were not 
removed before the welding began. (T. 506) They would have 
worked in Mallory's environmental chambers if they had been 
properly installed (see Exhibit 86) or if they had not been 
destroyed by the intense heat generated by welding. Installa-
tion by welding could permanently distort the thermostats. 
They are ruined at heat above +550°F. The welding process 
causes temperatures of up to 8,000°. (T. 518, 554-5) Since 
these heaters bore visible burn marks in the vicinity of the 
welding seals (T. 179), it is clear that the welding had a 
destructive effect on the thermostats. (T. 553-555) This 
caused them to malfunction for Mallory's tests, assuming the 
tests were correctly carried out. 
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POINT VI 
THE HEATERS MANUFACTURED BY VALAD 
FOR BROWN AND DELIVERED TO MALLORY, 
ON BROWN'S INSTRUCTIONS, COMPLIED 
FULLY AND EXACTLY WITH THE SPECI-
FICATIONS ESTABLISHED BY EXHIBIT 
20(83), BROWN'S COUNTER-PROPOSAL, 
WHICH VALAD HAD ACCEPTED (THUS 
CONSTITUTING THE ONLY CONTRACT IN 
THIS CASE WHICH IMPOSED ANY OBLI-
GATION UPON VALAD) . 
The specifications which Valad followed (T. 543-4) 
in manufacturing the 21 KW and 15 KW heaters sold to Brown 
were spelled out by Brown's speedletter and the two Valad 
shop drawings Nos. 73-119 and 73-120 (Exs. 20 and 83), 
which Carl Nyman had annotated. These three documents (the 
speedletter and the two shop drawings aforesaid) constitute 
Exhibit 83 (Exhibit 20). 
(1) The heaters' structure and construction, mandated 
by Exhibit 20, were built by Valad precisely (T. 543) as that 
Exhibit required. (T. 118-20; 183-4, 495, 543-4) "I built 
to those drawings," (T. 543) was McCarron's uncontradicted 
testimony. 
(2) The 21 and 15 KW heaters were meticulously based 
on the shop drawings. Neither Brown nor Mallory claimed that 
the structural drawings were violated by the actual construe-
tion of the heaters. Cecchini testified that Brown got what 
it had ordered. 
(3) There were three inserts, each having three thermo-
stats, due to the three "steps" in each insert. Thus, there 
was a total of 9 thermostats on the three inserts. (T. 146-9, 
151-3, 250, 282-3, 394, 410, 548-50, 554) 
(4) These thermostats were all set at 225°F., so that 
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the sheath temperature could not exceed 250°F. (T. 378, 
382, 383, 479, 508-9, 554-6, 123-4, 138, 144, 146, 154, 394, 
504-5, 509-10) 
(5) Valad eliminated holes for mounting and reduced 
other holes to a minimum. (T. 543-4) 
(6) The NBFU Code was complied with, as Valad's certif-
icates showed. 
(7) The thermostats were tested at Valad's factory and 
they worked satisfactorily and accurately. (T. 556, 549-50) 
(8) There were fins on the heating elements, just as 
the approved shop drawing required. 
(9) There were seals on the holes. 
(10) Instructions as to the flanges had been obeyed. 
Exhibit 83 (20) and its drawings as accepted and 
manufactured by Valad sold future goods, not yet manufactured 
nor tested. The contract constituted by that Exhibit says 
nothing at all about performance standards or criteria. The 
drawings are structural drawings approved by the parties for 
construction of the heaters. The latter were constructed in 
conformity with the drawings. (T. 543) At no time during 
the trial or in the complaint did Plaintiff contend or allege 
that the heaters were not constructed in accordance with the 
drawings in Exhibit 83 (20). McCarron's testimony on this 
(T. 543) is uncontradicted in the record. 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT'S AWARD OF $30,840.60 
AS OVERHEAD OR "INDIRECT COSTS OR 
DAMAGES" AGAINST VALAD IS TOTALLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND 
CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, U.C.A. 
1953 §§70A-2-711 - 715. 
The Court awarded the sum of $10,647.80 as "direct" 
costs and damages sustained by the Plaintiff. Of this sum, 
$8,072 was the increased cost of "cover" of replacement heaters, 
and the balance was incidental and consequential damages. 
Assuming arguendo that Mallory is entitled to recover, this 
would be the correct measure of damages under the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code, U.C.A. 1953 §§70.A-2-711 and 712 for a buyer 
(Mallory) who is forced to "cover" when the seller (for this 
purpose, Valad) "fails to make delivery or repudiates".* 
In addition, however, the Court found that Mallory 
was entitled to $30,840.60 as overhead or "indirect costs or 
damages" (Finding of Fact No. 25), despite strenuous objections 
at trial by Brown and Valad. (T. 689-702 and Exs. 100 and 102) 
Both Brown and Valad objected that such "indirect damages" or 
"overhead" are speculative in nature, not foreseeable by the 
parties, irrevelant to the delay and legally incorrect in general. 
(T. 696, 700, 702, 716) 
The Uniform Commercial Code Governs the Transaction 
The law in this case on damages is controlled by the 
Utah Uniform Commerical Code (all citations to Utah Code Ann., 
1953, unless otherwise noted). 70A-2-102, 105 and 106(1) 
*For the purpose of this point, both Mallory and Brown will 
be deemed to be the "buyer" and Valad the "seller", despite the 
fact that Valad's contract of sale was only with Brown. Thus, 
the same arguments apply to both Brown and Mallory as "buyers". 
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Mallory's rights against Valad are controlled by the provisions 
of U.C.A. §70A-2-711, which reads in pertinent part as follows: 
Where the seller (Valad or Brown) fails to 
make delivery or repudiates ... the buyer 
(Mallory) may cancel and ... 
(a) "cover" and have damages under ... 
(§712); or 
(b) recover damages for non-delivery 
as provided in this chapter. (Section 70A-2-7i3) 
No Statutory Provision Allows Overhead Damages 
In the instant case, Mallory as ultimate buyer 
elected to "cover" or, basically, seek damages for the dif-
ference between the cost of the heaters Mallory purchased from 
Regan after the alleged breach or "cover" price ($16,488), 
and the contract price with Brown ($8,416) (exlcuding the 12 
KW heaters), together with incidental and consequential damages. 
(Exs. 39-41, 102) Mallory is absolutely limited, as a buyer, 
to the difference between the contract price, and the "cover" 
price. The result would be no different under the alternative 
remedy of 70A-2-713 (market price at time of breach) . There 
is absolutely no statutory provision nor equitable ground for 
recovery of "overhead" sought by Mallory! 
Mallory cannot claim that overhead expense is in-
eluded in "incidental and consequential damages" under 70A-2-715. 
Incidental damages contemplate such things as inspection, trans· 
portation, and storage costs. Consequential damages have 
generally been held to encompass such anticipatable claims as 
lost future profits, additional interest charges, etc. Con-
sequential damages do not encompass such uncontemplated things 
as overhead or indirect damages. 17 A.L.R. 3d 1010 at 1117, §46. 
Only A "Seller" Can Recover Overhead Damages 
Under 70A-2-708 of the Uniform Commercial Code, onl) 
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a "seller" can recover indirect or overhead damages. This 
statute provides that where the standard measure of damages for 
non-acceptance or repudiation (the difference between the market 
price and the unpaid contract price, together with incidental 
and consequential damages), is inadequate to put the seller in 
as good a position as performance would have done, then 
... the measure of damages is the profit (including 
reasonable overhead) which the seller would have 
made from full performance by the buyer ..• (emphasis 
added). ?OA-2-708 
It is not a legislative oversight that gives "reason-
able overhead" damages only to a seller. The buyer is not given 
this remedy. Overhead damages are expressly reserved only to 
the seller, and specifically omitted for a buyer. Thus, the 
Court erred in awarding such damages to Mallory. 
The cases generally allow only a seller to recover 
"reasonable overhead", while excluding said recovery to buyers. 
(See 3 A.L.R. 3d 679) The general rule is that a seller may 
recover reasonable overhead expenses when the Defendant is 
responsible for Plaintiff's incuring or wasting "reasonably 
foreseeable" overhead expenses. Furthermore, the Plaintiff may 
only recover said overhead expenses when they are properly 
allocated with other jobs. (3 A.L.R. 3d at 69~ In Conditioned 
Air Corp. v. Rock Island M.T. Co., 114 N.W. 2d 304, 3 A.L.R. 3d 
679 (Iowa 1962), the plaintiff, a seller, had a contract to fur-
nish 206 aluminum panels for use in a school. The panels were 
shipped on defendant's truck and damaged in transit. The Court 
upheld the award of a percentage of Plaintiff's overhead expense 
as damages occasioned by the necessity of replacing the damaged 
panels. The award included an allocation of payroll taxes, 
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wages and salaries, workmen's compensation insurance, and 
other direct labor expenses related only to this particular job 
and excluded overhead expenses for other jobs upon which Plain-
tiff was concurrently working. Accord: Perfecting Service 
Company v. Product Development and Sale Co., 131 S.E. 2d 9 
(N.C. 1963); see also Lenobel v. Seniff, 300 N.Y.S. 226, 
resettled 1 N.Y.S. 2d 1022 (1937), wherein the Court held that 
awarding overhead damages would result in an awkward, cumber-
some inquiry into elements of overhead of which the Defendant 
had no personal knowledge and no means of meeting or refuting 
Plaintiff's claims. 
Mallory's Formula For Overhead Damages is Incorrect 
And Grossly Unfair 
Mallory is asking for a percentage of the entire over-
head for the entire year, for all Mallory's jobs, including 
the ones allegedly involved in this dispute. (Findings of Fact, 
Ex. A and Ex. 102) Mallory asked the Court below to multiply 
that total overhead times the percent that Mallory's total 
income bears to the income on the jobs in dispute. The formula 
might be expressed as follows: 
Total 
Overhead 
Expense 
On All, 
Non-Rela-
ted Jobs, 
FOR YEAR 
x 
"Income" From 
Disputed Job 
Total Income 
For the Year 
x 
Number of 
days delayed* 
in disputed 
job by alleged 
breach, as a 
percentage of 
the year 
DAMAGES 
Expressed in numbers, the formula for Job 277 (12 and 50 KW 
heaters) would read as follows: 
*See Point III for discussion of why this was an incorrect 
standard. 
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$206,243.00 112 
$143,893.88 x x $19,957.28 
$456,229.62 365 
The identical formula was used to calculate the overhead or 
indirect damages for each of the other two jobs in dispute. 
(Exhibit A of Findings of Fact) 
There is no law or evidence to support award of 
damages so calculated. Plaintiff's President, Farber, testified 
that these indirect expenses were simply the cost of business 
operation (overhead) (T. 683, ls. 7-14), and that it did not 
represent lost profit or lost business opportunity. Furthermore, 
he calculated them from Mallory's operating statement based upon 
delays in getting out the three disputed jobs as a percentage 
of the total overhead for the years '73 and '74. (T. 686-689) 
That is all that was ever said during the trial about how the 
indirect damages were calculated! 
The Use of "Income" As A Standard Is Not Appropriate 
The indirect damages were also figured as a percentage 
of total income. (Ex. 102) There is no legal justification for 
this. No testimony shows why "income" is a valid standard by 
which to measure overhead damages even if they are allowable. 
Most significantly, no testimony explains the substance 
or effect of the other delays that Mallory was experiencing due 
to problems not related to this lawsuit. Farber testified 
(T. 736-7) that after the replacement heaters were installed, 
"We had additional problems that required some more effort on 
the part of Mallory Engineering and their suppliers ... " (T. 737, 
ls. 9-11) These additional problems had nothing to do with the 
problems allegedly created by Valad. Therefore, the record con-
tains no evidence upon which the Court could logically or legally 
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assign all of the overhead for the year '73 and '74 as the basis 
upon which the income percentage was applied to arrive at the 
indirect damages. 
Use of "Income" Raises Collateral Issues 
There are many collateral issues that would and 
should be explored if this standard is to be applied in this 
case, to wit: Was Mallory's income abnormally low in '73 and 
'74 because of the recession, which is no fault of Valad? For 
what other reasons was Mallory's income so low? Were there 
instances where Mallory's debtors had not yet paid Mallory, 
thus creating abnormally low income? Were there delays on other 
jobs not related to this dispute which nevertheless increased 
Mallory's overhead? What v.ere the other independent production 
and financial problems on the jobs in dispute that were not 
attributable to Valad, which Mallory admitted? (T. 736-7) 
The Trial Court's Standard Of Damages 
Is Purely Speculative 
The effect of these and other factors on the amount of 
overhead and the allocation that could be attributed to Valad's 
alleged breach are purely speculative and conjectural, as well 
as collateral. This Court has repeatedly held that: 
The general rule is that an award of damages 
cannot properly be made on mere possibility 
or conjecture, there must be a firmer founda-
tion. That is, any such award must be sup-
ported by proof upon which reasonable minds 
acting fairly thereon could believe that it is 
more probable than not that damage was actually 
suffered. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Insurance, 
559 P. 2d 958 at 961 (Utah 1977) 
See also Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P. 2d 456 (1954), 
where the Court held: 
... only such damages are recoverable as are shown 
with reasonable certainty to have been sustained. 
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Remote, contingent and conjectual losses will 
not be considered. Sutherland on Damages, 4th 
Ed., Section 1775, as cited Id. at 459. 
Plaintiff's measure of damages for indirect, overhead expenses 
can only be considered conjectural and speculative. 
Furthermore, this Court has often held that a trial 
Court must evaluate any loss suffered by the most direct, 
practical and accurate method that can be employed. Even Olds, 
Inc. v. Nielson, 22 Utah 2d 49, 448 P. 2d 709 (1968). The 
most direct and accurate approach for a buyer who is damaged is 
the approach used by the Uniform Conunercial Code: The cost of 
"cover" plus incidental and consequential damages resulting 
therefrom. In this case, that sum would be under $11,000. 
(Ex. 102) 
Mallory's Overhead Damages Were Not Foreseeable 
In addition, damages are not proper unless they may be 
reasonably assumed to have been within the contemplation of the 
parties as a probable result of the breach. Jim Mahoney v. 
Galokee Corp., 522 P. 2d 428 (Kan. 1974) In other words, unless 
the damages are foreseeable, there can be no recovery. In the 
case at the bar, it was never contended that either Brown or 
Valad could have foreseen that the sale of the allegedly defec-
tive heaters would result in a recovery of one-fifth of the 
total overhead of the Plaintiff's operation during a particular 
year. 
Bad Public Policy 
This raises a particularly strong policy argument 
against the position taken by Plaintiff: If manufacturers of 
small, component items are forced to bear the risk of incurring 
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charges or overhead expenses that exceed, by many times, the 
value of the component (in this case, about $7 ,000), how can,, 
small manufacturer like Valad ever afford to take the risk for 
such a small amount of money? The result would be a specta-
1 
cular jump in the costs of items such as Valad's heaters, sine. 
no company could afford to assume liability for such unknown, 
uninsurable, conjectural damages. 
The relationship between the costs of the heaters 
as charged by Valad in relation to the damages assessed (see 
Ex. A, Findings of Fact) is as follows: 
Price of heaters (Exs. 10, 11, 13, 
15) charged to Brown by Valad: $ 7,060.00 
Price of heaters (Ex. 16) charged 
to Mallory by Brown: $ 9, 262. 00 
Valad's risk (Findings of Fact) as 
determined by direct damages: $10,647.80 
Valad's risk (Findings of Fact) as 
determined by indirect damages: $30,840.60 
Valad's total risk: $41,488.40 
On this showing, Valad thus unknowingly undertook a risk 5.88 
times as great as its $7,060 order. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant Valad seeks initially to impress upon 
the Court that the lower Court never had jurisdiction in the 
first place. The line of cases beginning with Hill v. Zale 
demonstrate that there simply were not sufficient contacts 
to lawfully bring Valad into this action and Valad never 
intentionally submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the 
Court. 
In addition, Valad argues most strenuously that the 
Trial Court completely ignored and misapplied the basic funda-
mental principles of contract law. The law compels the con-
clusion that there was no contract between Mallory and Valad, 
but that there was a contract between Brown and Valad. Further-
more, the contract between Brown and Valad was consummated by 
the meeting of the minds that occured when Brown approved the 
construction drawings represented by Exhibit 20 (also Ex. 83). 
The clear preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that there 
was no other contract other than Exhibit 20 (83), and that 
Valad manufactured the heaters strictly pursuant to the require-
ments of Exhibit 20. 
Valad further strenuously contends that regardless 
of the terms of contract between itself and Brown, or re-
gardless of whether Mallory was a third party beneficiary of 
said contract, Mallory accepted the heaters pursuant to the 
terms of the Uniform Commercial Code, made no valid or effective 
rejection, and later repudiated without cause the contract, 
thus giving Valad the right to suspend any performance not yet 
due. The evidence also demonstrates that the "delay time'' 
upon which Mallory computed damages was totally unsupported 
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by the evidence since Mallory clearly waived any requirement 
that the heaters be shipped within six weeks of its purchase 
orders. 
Finally, the computation of damages itself wherein 
the Trial Court awarded indirect or overhead damages is 
totally unsupported by the evidence, contrary to law, and a 
serious breach of sound public policy. 
Defendant and Appellant Valad requests that this 
Court simply reverse the judgment of the Trial Court as to 
Valad, or in the alternative, grant Valad a new trial on the 
issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Godfrey P. Schmidt 
Robert B. Sykes 
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